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ARTICLE
THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS VS.
THE FEDERALIST COURTS
BY KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN*
The conflict between Jeffersonian Republicans and the Federalist-
dominated federal courts was the longest-running, most consequential as-
pect of the party conflict pitting former revolutionary brothers-in-arms
against one another. It centered on Virginia, which, not coincidentally, con-
tributed the most significant players to both sides and where some of the
key court cases arose. The repercussions of this long-running confrontation




Our story begins in pre-Revolutionary Virginia. In 1774, at the climax
of the Imperial Crisis of the 1760s–1770s, a member of the House of Bur-
gesses named Thomas Jefferson sat down in his Albemarle County home,
Monticello, to draft legislative instructions for the Virginia delegates to the
upcoming Continental Congress. Jefferson hoped that Virginia’s congress-
men, who would be elected by the House of Burgesses, would insist on a
highly pugnacious American communication with the king.
Jefferson detailed what by that time had come to be the standard Vir-
ginia Patriot argument.1 The colonies (Virginia) had been created by the
initial settlers through their own effort and with their own money. Their
departure from England had been undertaken in exercise of their natural
* Professor, Department of History, Western Connecticut State University; Ph.D. (Ameri-
can History) 1999, University of Virginia; J.D. 1990, University of Texas; Master of Public Af-
fairs 1990, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas; Master of Arts
(History) 1994, University of Virginia; B.A. 1985, University of Texas.
1. K[evin] R. Constantine Gutzman, Jefferson’s Draft Declaration of Independence, Rich-
ard Bland, and the Revolutionary Legacy: Giving Credit Where Credit is Due, 1 J. HIST. SOC’Y
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right to emigrate (this radical idea was an invention of Jefferson’s older
kinsman, Burgess Richard Bland), and their emigration had severed their
inherited tie to Parliament, which thus retained no authority over them. The
colonial link between England/Britain and the colonies (Virginia) had been
established by the colonists’ free will. If the king ceased to fulfill the func-
tions for which his office had been given to him, the colonists retained the
right to strip him of that office and replace him with someone else, even to
remake their government altogether.
“Let those flatter who fear,” Jefferson (never very assertive in person)
thundered. “It is not an American art.” George should understand that he
was the colonists’ servant, not their proprietor. Each of the colonies retained
the rights of self-government it had had in its primeval state, before it had
(in Jefferson’s account) voluntarily entered into a relationship with the
Crown. While the king had rightful authority concerning some policy is-
sues, notably in relation to matters of foreign policy, the colonists would
resist in case he pushed the last several years’ interference in the colonies’
internal matters much further. The British Empire could be a happy, if a
well-poised, empire.
In contemporary constitutional terms, what Jefferson did here was to
lay out a federal view of the British Empire. He based this conception on a
somewhat fantastical idea of the voluntary, separate consent of each of the
thirteen colonies.
Although physical indisposition meant that Delegate Jefferson could
not personally propose these instructions to his fellow members of the Old
Dominion’s political elite in 1774, some of the colonial political leadership
took the opportunity to slap the rather un-Jeffersonian title “A Summary
View of the Rights of British America” on it and publish a few copies. Soon
enough, this publication made Jefferson the talk of the North American po-
litical world.
B.
Jefferson thus found himself a member of the Second Continental
Congress in 1776. If he had had his way, he would have been relieved of
that office, however. Everyone knew that the Virginia Convention to con-
vene in May would be drafting a republican constitution, so Williamsburg
was where the action was. As Jefferson plaintively pleaded, helping to draft
that constitution should be his destiny. It required the assistance of Vir-
ginia’s leading men. Nothing was more important, he believed: “In truth it
is the whole object of the present controversy; for should a bad government
be instituted for us in future it had been as well to have accepted at first the
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bad one offered to us from beyond the water without the risk and expence
[sic] of contest.”2
In the Continental Congress, each state had one vote. That vote could
be cast by a quorum of the state’s delegation. Unfortunately, Virginia had
only a bare quorum in attendance, which meant that if Jefferson departed
for Williamsburg, Virginia would be left without a vote. Although they re-
ceived Jefferson’s several letters begging to be replaced in Congress, Con-
vention leaders such as George Mason, Edmund Pendleton, and Patrick
Henry did not comply. He would have to content himself with a congress-
man’s work.
Work that made him immortal.3 Congress responded to Virginia con-
gressman Richard Henry Lee’s motion that “these colonies are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent states” by appointing a five-man commit-
tee to draft a declaration to that effect. It named the author of “A Summary
View” to the committee, which also included eminent members John Ad-
ams of Massachusetts and Benjamin Franklin, the only world-famous
American.
From several decades’ removed, former chairman Adams recalled four
reasons why he had assigned the task of writing a rough draft to the much
younger, far more reserved Jefferson: that Jefferson was a Virginian, which
was an important political factor in light of Virginia’s outsized population
and its enormous geographic extent, while Adams was from Massachusetts;
that Jefferson was southern, while he northern; that Adams was “obnox-
ious” (by which he meant that other members were sick of hearing him
constantly pound the drum for independence); and that Jefferson—author
of, among other things, “A Summary View”—was a better writer.4
By this point, Jefferson had already written and dispatched a draft con-
stitution for Virginia. Friends in Williamsburg told him that it had arrived
too late in the process to be used in the drafting. However, the Jeffersonian
preamble laying out the case for independence was used, as were a few
small suggestions such as that the upper legislative house should be named
after the Roman Senate.
Back in Philadelphia, Jefferson presented his draft to Adams and
Franklin, who each made a few stylistic/detail changes. The committee’s
work done, the draft Declaration was reported to the full Congress, where
major excisions were made over Adams’ vehement objections. Not affected
by these changes, however, were the central points of the Declaration. The
final document’s argument reflected the draftsman’s case of 1774 quite
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson (May 16, 1776), in THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 292–293 (Julian P. Boyd, et al. eds., 1950).
3. KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN, THOMAS JEFFERSON—REVOLUTIONARY: A RADICAL’S STRUGGLE
TO REMAKE AMERICA 9–97 (2017).
4. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
99 (5th prtg. 1997).
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clearly: rightful government rests on the consent of the governed, the peo-
ple can replace the government when the government does not fulfill the
purposes for which it was created, King George III has not fulfilled his
function to the Americans’ satisfaction, and so “these colonies are, and of
right ought to be, free and independent states.”
Note the plural. The congressmen, each selected by his homeland’s
legislature, announced to the world that what had been colonies were now
states—that is, sovereign entities. They were not one nation, but thirteen
integral units. The word “state” had had that signification since it was intro-
duced into modern political science by Machiavelli.
C.
Congress did this work on the fly. One reason Adams omitted from his
explanation of his assignment of draftsman’s duties to Jefferson was that
he, Adams, had more important work to do. Armies had to be raised, diplo-
macy had to be conducted, money had to be found or raised, provisions had
to be obtained. John Adams bore a highly disproportionate share of the
congressional load. Among the other tasks to which Congress turned its
attention was that of drafting a federal constitution.
Adams at one point referred to Congress as a meeting place of ambas-
sadors, and so it was. It functioned essentially as an interstate clearinghouse
of government policy, hashing out differences and forwarding the results to
the states so that they could act on them (or, often, not). Any authority
Congress had remained informal. It rested essentially on state governments’
voluntary cooperation. In response to this problem, Congress in 1777 sent
the states for their unanimous ratification the Articles of Confederation.
The Articles did not envision any radical reallocation of authority.
Rather, if adopted, they would mean that Congress’s acts now rested on
firm legal and political footing. The underlying theory was that the states
were sovereign, which meant that they each possessed full power to take
any step which a government might take, and thus the Articles could not go
into effect in any of them until it had agreed that they should.
Besides retaining the Declaration’s terminology of “United States of
America,” the Articles also made this sovereignty point explicit. Article II,
the first substantive article, said that each state “retained” (would continue
to have) “its sovereignty.” Thereafter, the powers the Confederation gov-
ernment might exercise were listed and the mechanisms it could use were
described and established.
Within a relatively short time, twelve states ratified the Articles. Only
Maryland held out. It could not agree to enter into federal relations with so
extensive a state as Virginia, Maryland said, because a state extending from
the Atlantic to Minnesota must have so large a share of the federation’s
population as forever to dwarf Maryland. Thus, Marylanders’ government
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would be forever dominated by people from the neighboring state. Only
Virginia’s Northwest Cession of 1781, by which it surrendered all of its
trans-Ohio River claims to the Confederation government, finally elicited
ratification from Maryland, and thus put the Articles into effect.
II.
A.
By then, however, self-styled “Federalists”—men who wanted more
power in the central government than the Articles provided—had embarked
on a new quest.5 They wanted substantial amendment to the Articles,
amendment granting the Congress power to collect taxes independently of
state governments. These Federalists, not to be confused with the 1790s
political party of the same name or with proponents of the federal principle
then and since, believed that state governments would always be stingy in
their support for the Confederation, and so they moved to augment Con-
gress’s powers.6 If the states would not cooperate, the Confederation should
be able to act without state cooperation.
Ultimately, Federalist efforts to strengthen Congress by amending the
Articles of Confederation failed because Rhode Island, easily the smallest
state, refused to cooperate, and amendment required ratification by all thir-
teen states. Failing that, what to do?
B.
James Madison moved in the Virginia General Assembly for a confer-
ence of delegates from Virginia and Maryland to meet at Mt. Vernon,
George Washington’s Potomac River estate, in summer 1785 to iron out the
two Potomac states’ difficulties in sharing their river. Achieving some suc-
cess, they decided jointly to call on all thirteen states to send delegates to
Annapolis the next summer. The entire confederacy needed to work out its
commercial policies, both interstate and international.
When the appointed date in fall 1786 arrived, however, only five
states’ delegations appeared in Annapolis. Although another was en route,
this clearly would not suffice for a thoroughgoing reapportionment of the
Confederation’s commercial powers, with cession by the states of new pow-
ers to the Congress. Therefore, three of the energetic leaders of the Federal-
ist movement in attendance at Annapolis, Madison, his Virginian colleague,
5. This Section relies upon one of my prior works. See generally KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN,
JAMES MADISON AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA (2012).
6. See generally KEITH L. DOUGHERTY, COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CON-
FEDERATION (2001) (whether states actually were grudging in their support for the Confederation
Congress is an interesting question. Scholars generally have echoed Federalist propaganda in this
regard, but recent scholarship argues that Federalists drastically overstated their case. States did
not contribute more, the argument goes, because they were unable to do so).
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Edmund Randolph, and New York’s Alexander Hamilton, took it upon
themselves to craft a call from this abortive gathering to all thirteen state
legislatures. There should be another convention in summer 1787, this time
at more centrally located Philadelphia, with a more wide-ranging assign-
ment. Not only commercial policy, but all of the Articles of Confederation’s
shortcomings should be addressed then. Other attendees signed, and the
communique was sent off to Congress—then meeting in New York City.
Congress soon forwarded this call for a convention with the purposes
of drafting proposed amendments to the Articles of Confederation to meet
in the City of Brotherly Love the following May. In the end, twelve states
joined in the effort. The lone holdout would be Rhode Island, the shoal on
which the campaign for a tariff amendment had run aground.
Madison hurried back to Virginia to ensure not only that Virginia
would send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, but that George
Washington would head the delegation selected by the General Assembly.
Having seen to Washington’s selection, Madison launched a successful ef-
fort to persuade the general his attendance would be essential. His and
others’ letters highlighting Shays’ Rebellion and other signs of impending
dissolution of the Confederation convinced the Indispensable Man that this
was indeed the crisis of American liberty.
C.
When the Philadelphia Convention opened on May 25, 1787, then,
Washington was present to accept election as president. The second motion
from the floor was to close the doors, send the reporters home, and swear
every participant to secrecy. With that accomplished, the real work began.
Virginia’s young governor, Edmund Randolph, stood and announced
that he had fifteen resolutions for the delegates’ consideration. America, he
said, needed a “national” government with a “national” legislature, a “na-
tional” executive, and a “national” judiciary. He went on to describe a bi-
cameral legislature in which each house was apportioned by population and
state legislatures no longer exercised their accustomed power of choosing
members of Congress. Instead, the lower house would be popularly elected
and the upper would be elected by the lower. Not only that, but this “Vir-
ginia Plan” (so called by historians because not Randolph, but Madison was
its chief author) included provisions that the national legislature would be
able to legislate about essentially any important question and would have a
veto over all state laws, besides provisions that the “national” judiciary
should have a supreme court and inferior courts, and the national courts
should be able to hear virtually any significant case. To cap it off, the na-
tional constitution and treaties and laws made pursuant to it would be para-
mount to state constitutions and laws.
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In our time, “national” and “federal” often are used interchangeably,
but in the eighteenth century, they were alternative models of government:
the former denoted a unitary system, perhaps with subordinate administra-
tive units, while the latter referred to a decentralized system in which a
central authority exercised certain delegated powers. On hearing the first
“national” from Randolph, other delegates’ ears pricked up. By the time he
finished his lengthy speech, several had objections.
They came to this: Congress and the state legislatures had charged the
Philadelphia Convention with proposing amendments to the Articles of
Confederation. To craft a national government instead would be beyond the
powers conferred upon the delegates by their state legislatures, as the com-
missions borne by several states’ delegates made clear. Some went so far as
to say that if this was going to be the Philadelphia Convention’s work, they
could not have any part of it. They would bolt this august assemblage and
return home to organize opposition to ratification.
While the Philadelphia Convention spent considerable time on issues
such as apportionment of the legislature, the means of choosing legislators,
the taxing power, protections for slavery, and the lengths of various offi-
cials’ terms, the national/federal question arose again and again. A few
weeks into the convention, on July 5, two of New York’s three delegates
stormed out of the assemblage, never to return, after explaining that writing
a national constitution was not what their state legislature had sent them to
do.
James Madison is commonly called “the Father of the Constitution.”7
Yet, he was terribly dissatisfied with the Philadelphia Convention’s handi-
work precisely because it was not so national as he had hoped. His dogged
insistence that both houses of the national legislature be apportioned by
population finally won him a warning from the more pragmatic John Dick-
inson of tiny Delaware that if Madison won his way in structuring both
houses, small states such as Delaware would not go along, and the conven-
tion would come to naught. Madison doggedly insisted anyway.
The other point about which Madison refused to compromise was that
of a national legislative veto over all state laws. Madison’s diagnosis of the
Confederation’s ailments put most of the blame on state governments.
When not simply omitting to do their duty, he thought, they were actively
thwarting Congress’s policies. A national legislature would be more trust-
worthy—less factious—than the state legislatures, and so could be trusted
with power to negate their typically wrong-headed obstruction.8
7. See GUTZMAN, supra note 5, at 49–131 (for Madison and the Philadelphia Convention).
8. See JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch5s16.html (Madison’s
summary of problems under the Articles of Confederation, which concludes with a summary of
the argument about faction he is shown making in his notes of the Philadelphia Convention and
laid out in detail in The Federalist No. 10); see generally MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S
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Besides being featured in Governor Randolph’s opening speech, the
legislative veto came to delegates’ attention courtesy of their insistent Vir-
ginian colleague across the Philadelphia summer. When last he brought it
up, in the convention’s final week, it went down to defeat by a vote of ten
states to zero. Madison put his disappointment over the rejection of his “fa-
vorite” proposal at the center of his explanation to his friend Thomas Jeffer-
son five weeks after the convention of his reasons for thinking the
Constitution, even if ratified, would fail within a few years.9
As he always insisted, Madison should not be considered Father of the
Constitution. His and his fellow Virginia delegates’ plan for a national gov-
ernment in the Virginia Plan did not make it through the Philadelphia con-
clave. The draft US Constitution featured a bicameral legislature, yes, but it
would not be apportioned entirely by population, state legislatures would
not lose their accustomed role in selecting legislators, Congress would not
have power to legislate concerning all important questions, and it would not
have a veto over all state laws. Not only that, but besides mandating that
there be a supreme court, the Constitution said only that the Congress could
create inferior courts if it wanted to and beyond the rarest kinds of politi-
cally-fraught cases (between states, for example) it enumerated a few kinds
of cases those courts could—could—be empowered by Congress to decide.
In short, the Constitution would be a federal one, if it would be at all.
D.
The Philadelphia Convention sent the Constitution to Congress for for-
warding to the states, where the Article VII ratification process could be
implemented. In Congress, skeptics such as Virginia’s Richard Henry Lee
tried to brand the draft charter as inconsistent with the delegates’ charges.
Proponents of ratification such as Madison had had all they could do to
have it sent along with neither praise nor criticism.
Meanwhile, the ratification campaign had already begun. Federalists—
proponents of ratifying the unamended Constitution—knew they had
trouble. After all, not only had two of three New York delegates (one of
them the state’s chief justice) left Philadelphia promising to prevent Empire
State ratification, but Randolph, Mason, and Massachusetts’ Elbridge Gerry
had forborne signing despite staying to the convention’s end. Among their
stated reasons were several having to do with the national/federal issue.
Mason vowed on the convention floor that he would return to the Old Do-
minion and work for the Constitution’s rejection.
HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015) (that Madison actually offered this
argument in Philadelphia seems dubious now).
9. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 14, 1787), http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0151.
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New York newspapers had already carried lengthy essays forcefully
critiquing the Constitution. On October 6, 1787, Pennsylvania’s Philadel-
phia Convention delegate James Wilson responded to the public arguments
with what would become the most widely disseminated rebuttal of the Anti-
federalist arguments: his State House Speech.10 His chief contention con-
cerned Antifederalist insistence that a bill of rights must be added to the
Constitution prior to ratification. This argument, the future Supreme Court
justice held, rested on a misconception. The new government and the state
governments would rest on contrary bases: while state governments had all
powers their constitutions did not deny them, the new general government
would have only the powers the Constitution granted it. In other words, it
would be a federal government, not a national one.
Federalists up and down the continent reprinted Wilson’s speech nu-
merous times. The contending parties discussed it in several ratification
conventions. Besides that, leading Federalists returned to this general argu-
ment in state after state. William Cushing made Wilson’s point about the
proposed central government’s powers in Massachusetts, James Iredell
pushed this argument in North Carolina, Framer Alexander Hamilton re-
layed this point to the Poughkeepsie Ratification Convention in New York,
Framer Charles Cotesworth Pinckney insisted upon it in South Carolina,
Framer Roger Sherman thought it odd that anyone denied the truth of Wil-
son’s argument in Connecticut, Framer John Dickinson insisted the new
government would have only the specified powers in Delaware, and two
more of the leading Philadelphia Convention participants—Edmund Ran-
dolph and James Madison—made this claim a centerpiece of their case for
ratification in Virginia. The chief Federalist argument was that this would
be a federal, not a national government.
Antifederalists disbelieved it. They had reason to suspect the Federal-
ists, for the Philadelphia Convention had been charged with proposing
amendments to the Articles of Confederation, and it had not even consid-
ered doing so. Instead, it had taken up a proposal for a national government
clearly superordinate to the state governments.
Although they were able to rush the Constitution to ratification in five
states right away, Federalists encountered substantial opposition in New
Hampshire and North Carolina. Antifederalist victory in Massachusetts, the
next state up, might well decide the issue. Wily Federalists there lit upon a
strategy: they would enlist Governor John Hancock by pointing out that in
case Virginia had not ratified the Constitution by the time it was imple-
10. Notice that proponents of ratifying the unamended Constitution stole a march on their
opponents, taking the name “Federalists” and dubbing their opponents “Antifederalists” when in
fact they were nationalists and their opponents were federalists. George Mason objected, observ-
ing that the actual division was between proponents of ratification and its opponents—so that the
two groupings might more accurately be called “rats” and “antirats.” Scholars, ever prone to take
government’s side, have used Federalists’ terminology.
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mented, George Washington could not be the president and Hancock would
be the obvious alternative, and they would use him as a vehicle for their
offer that even in ratifying the unamended Constitution, Massachusetts Fed-
eralists would vow to seek amendments such as the Massachusetts Ratifica-
tion Convention might suggest in the first Congress under the new
Constitution. Governor Hancock took the bait, Massachusetts narrowly rati-
fied, and Federalists in later ratification conventions had a new strategy to
use.
E.
With that, two of the three populous states—Massachusetts and Penn-
sylvania—had ratified, and Virginia would take the matter up next.11 The
Old Dominion’s debate of May–June 1788, which pitted Edmund Ran-
dolph, James Madison, George Nicholas, and their fellow Federalists
against Patrick Henry, George Mason, William Grayson, and the finest co-
hort of Antifederalists in the country, deserves more attention than it has
received. For present purposes, however, it can be summarized rather
easily.12
Patrick Henry kicked off the Richmond Ratification Convention by
pointing out that the Preamble amounted to a statement that the Philadel-
phia Convention had exceeded its writ. Where, he demanded, had Vir-
ginia’s delegates—some of whom were in the room—obtained the right to
use the language of “We, the People?” The Federalist delegate presiding
said Henry’s query was out of order, as the people had elected them to the
convention with the idea that they might ratify the Constitution in mind.
This ipse dixit put an end to Henry’s salvo without by any means resolving
the issue.
Repeatedly during the convention’s proceedings from June 2–27,
1788, Henry fulminated against the Constitution as doing more to change
the form and nature of the federal union than Virginians wanted done.13
Each grant of new power to the new government, each vague locution in the
Constitution, drew Henry’s ire. As he told it, if the Constitution were rati-
fied unamended, the new Federal Government would claim essentially un-
limited legislative power over Virginians. In time, it would become
11. For the Virginia Ratification Convention, see KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN, VIRGINIA’S AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION: FROM DOMINION TO REPUBLIC, 1776–1840, at 83–112 (2007) and GUTZMAN,
supra note 5, at 187–238.
12. See generally ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787–1788, at 182–234 (1966) (for further
information on the Virginia Ratification Convention); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEO-
PLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 255–319 (2010); 8–10 THE DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE
STATES: VIRGINIA (John P. Kaminski, et al. eds., 1988–1993).
13. See generally HENRY MAYER, A SON OF THUNDER: PATRICK HENRY AND THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1986).
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oppressive. George Mason developed this case further, asserting that federal
courts would oppress the poor and Congress would provide only the
shadow of representation. Both of them pointed repeatedly to the absence of
a bill of rights as proof that the contemplated new government would abuse
their Virginian compatriots if it were called into being before the necessary
amendments’ adoption.
Governor Randolph surprised the state by declaring early on in the
convention that since eight of the nine states required to put the Constitu-
tion into effect had already ratified by the time Virginia’s delegates assem-
bled, amending prior to implementing the Constitution was no longer an
option, and therefore he had to side with the Federalists. Here, Madison’s
intensive campaign to coax him into the Federalist camp bore fruit. Ran-
dolph’s help proved rather uncomfortable, however, as he remained vocal
about the reasons for his dissatisfaction with the Constitution as it stood.
In response to the Antifederalists, Madison carefully argued that the
General Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause served only
to limit the taxing power and to ensure that the enumerated powers could be
fully exercised, respectively. In other words, despite his having favored a
national plan in Philadelphia and having lamented his defeat in the lengthi-
est letter of all his lifelong correspondence with Thomas Jefferson on Octo-
ber 24, 1787, Madison conceded that the Constitution was a federal, not a
national, one. In fact, he made this his central contention.
Ironically, then, the Virginia Ratification Convention came down to
this: Federalists, led by the Philadelphia Convention nationalists Randolph
and Madison and prominent House of Delegates leader George Nicholas,
argued that the Constitution was a federal one, while Philadelphia Conven-
tion non-participant (he had been elected but stayed away, explaining that
he “smelt a rat”) Patrick Henry and non-juror George Mason led Antifeder-
alist delegates who bewailed the fact that it was not.
Through the entire convention, delegates remained evenly divided.
Neither side felt sufficiently confident to push things to a conclusion,
though Federalists thought they had a majority of the committed delegates.
In response to Henry’s arguments, in particular, Governor Randolph repeat-
edly vowed that Congress would have only the powers “expressly” granted.
At the convention’s end, just before the final vote on ratification, Nicholas
explained that if it ratified, Virginia would be one of thirteen parties to a
compact, and so its stated understanding of that act’s import would bind the
others. If the new government abused the powers the Constitution gave it,
Nicholas insisted, Virginians could “reclaim” them.
One might have thought that Nicholas’ argument followed directly
from the plain language of Article VII of the Constitution: “The ratification
of the conventions of nine states, shall be sufficient for the establishment of
this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same.” Yet, time would
tell.
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Ultimately, Virginia ratified the Constitution by a vote of 89–79. Prior
to the final vote, Henry vowed that he would abide by the majority’s deci-
sion, whatever it might be. While historians commonly credit Federalist
delegates with the narrow success of their cause, Antifederalist delegate
James Monroe wrote the night of the final vote that George Washington’s
known advocacy of the Constitution had “carried this government.” Al-
though Henry kept his word regarding extralegal resistance, he also exer-
cised his control over the Virginia General Assembly to ensure that
prominent Antifederalists William Grayson and Richard Henry Lee, not
James Madison, represented Virginia as senators in the First Congress.
Henry also led the way in drawing Madison a congressional district that
included Monroe’s home.
III.
Madison thus found himself in a closely-contested House election.14
Despite his preference, he had for the first time to mount rostra all over his
district and address assemblages of local farmers. Among other things, he
assured them that he would work to add amendments to the Constitution
insulating Baptists’ and others’ religions from federal interference. Nar-
rowly elected, Madison worked in the House—despite his colleagues’ resis-
tance—to fulfill this promise.
The twelve amendments Madison prompted Congress to propose for
the states’ ratification have been the subject of substantial dispute in the
past century. Of particular note has been the place of federalism (aka states’
rights) in the original constitutional model. Close acquaintance with Con-
gress’s work, however, leaves no doubt that federalism underlay them all.
Madison’s initial proposal included an early version of what became
the Tenth Amendment, as well as the religion provisions he had promised
his constituents and a provision barring state governments’ infringement of
the freedom of the press, the right to trial by jury, and freedom of con-
science. By the time Congress was through with these, the proposal con-
cerning state governments’ behavior—which would have augmented the
Federal Government’s power vis-a`-vis state governments—had been
dropped, and the third proposal—which became the First Amendment—
began by saying, “Congress shall make no law. . . .”15 If that were not
enough to seal the case that federalism underlay all of the proposed amend-
ments, Congress sent them to the states with a Preamble saying they were
being proposed to calm worries that had arisen during the ratification cam-
14. GUTZMAN, supra note 5, at 239–278.
15. Madison’s initial proposal is Madison Resolution, June 8, 1789. CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 11–14 (Helen E. Veit
et al. eds., 1991).
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paign over the perception that the limits of the new government’s authority
were unclear.16
IV.
As Congress created the Bill of Rights, it also dealt with the more
pressing tasks of creating the federal Judicial and Executive Branches. Arti-
cle III of the Constitution said there would be a supreme court with a chief
justice “and such inferior courts as Congress from time to time [might]
ordain and establish.” Although it did not follow up on Madison’s pledge to
give the new government a go without inferior courts, it did, in the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, create a remarkably decentralized federal judicial system.
Yes, Section 25 provided for appeal of federal questions from state supreme
courts to the US Supreme Court, but the law in a diversity case would be
the forum state’s law, each state would have at least one US district court,
and a substantial amount-in-controversy requirement would limit the fed-
eral courts’ diversity jurisdiction.
V.
A.
Far more pressing was the creation of the Executive Branch, which
counted precisely one official when George Washington took his hand off
the Bible after reciting the presidential oath of office. Congress hurriedly
established the Departments of State, the Treasury, and War, along the way
instructing the as-yet-unnamed secretary of the treasury to submit a report
outlining a proposed financial plan. As soon as Alexander Hamilton took
office as the first such secretary, he quickly got about the business of doing
precisely that.17
Among the notably British-inflected proposals Hamilton made was
that the Federal Government should assume responsibility for all of the
state governments’ war-related debts. Surveying the financial landscape, he
realized that while constitutionally the US Government bore no responsibil-
ity for Delaware’s or (most significantly) Rhode Island’s debts, as a practi-
cal matter European lenders were apt to downgrade American debt in
general if some state government defaulted. This could best be avoided, he
reasoned, by sweeping all thirteen state government debt accounts into one
giant Federal Government account.
As a financial matter, Hamilton’s policy proposal proved a smashing
success: the interest borne by American bonds declined markedly as soon as
Assumption of State Debts became known in Europe. On the other hand,
16. THOMAS E. WOODS, JR. & KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN, WHO KILLED THE CONSTITUTION? THE
FATE OF AMERICAN LIBERTY FROM WORLD WAR I TO GEORGE W. BUSH 215 (2007).
17. For the clearest account of Hamilton’s program as Secretary of the Treasury, see gener-
ally FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY (1979).
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Hamilton’s proposal provoked unease among significant Virginians con-
cerning the vector of Hamiltonian policy and political science.
Assumption passed through Congress relatively easily. Yet, it drew the
ire of the Virginia General Assembly. In that, America’s most storied legis-
lative body, former Antifederalist generalissimo Patrick Henry and one-
time Richmond Ratification Convention Federalist Henry “Light-Horse
Harry” Lee responded to Assumption with a legislative resolution.18 As-
sumption and another of Hamilton’s initiatives, funding of the debt, were
“repugnant to the constitution” and “dangerous to the rights and subversive
of the interests of the people.” Virginia had ratified the Constitution only on
the condition that Congress’s powers would be limited to those expressly
granted. Nothing in the Constitution expressly gave Congress power to as-
sume state debts. Virginia would be watchful lest Congress undertake to
oppress Virginians through further arrogations of powers reserved to the
states.
B.
By year’s end, Madison—who, remember, was in the House due to
Henry’s machinations—had taken up the same argument in Congress.19
Hamilton’s Bank Bill could not be squared with the Constitution, the con-
gressman insisted, because nothing in Article I, Section 8 gave Congress
power to issue a bank a charter. The bill’s proponents argued that the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause could be used for
this purpose, but Madison denied it: the General Welfare Clause must be
read as tying the taxing power to the enumeration of specific congressional
powers immediately following it, while the proposed bank could hardly be
called necessary to the exercise of any of the powers listed in Article I,
Section 8. Power to charter corporations remained entirely with the states.
With the Bank Bill’s passage, President Washington faced a serious
constitutional problem: what to make of Madison’s argument in the House.
Given the congressional margins in favor of Hamilton’s proposal, any other
congressman’s opposition would probably have been sloughed off.
Madison, however, had played a unique role in establishing the Constitution
and the new Federal Government, not only taking the lead in persuading
Washington to attend the Philadelphia Convention and drafting his First
Inaugural Address, etc., but also lending his expert advice in staffing the
major federal offices—including advocacy of nominating Hamilton for sec-
retary of the treasury.20 Thus, Madison’s arguments must have impressed
the president.
18. GUTZMAN, supra note 5, at 273.
19. Id. at 256 et seq.
20. STUART LEIBIGER, FOUNDING FRIENDSHIP: GEORGE WASHINGTON, JAMES MADISON, AND
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 58–123 (1999).
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In 2017, for President Donald Trump to hold Cabinet meetings on the
subject of whether to veto his administration’s leading pending initiative
would be exceedingly odd. In 1790, however, George Washington had a
different understanding of the presidency than we.21 Washington seems to
have accepted the idea that the veto power gives the president the duty of
ensuring that the Congress not overstep the bounds of its delegated author-
ity. He held several Cabinet discussions of the Bank Bill to gather his top
advisors’ considered opinions on the subject.
Famously, the four-man Cabinet split into two groups, with Secretary
of the Treasury Hamilton, supported by Secretary of War Henry Knox, ad-
vising that the president sign the bill and Secretary of State Jefferson and
Attorney General Randolph urging that he not do so. When Washington
asked them for written opinions, Jefferson and Hamilton gave him classic
accounts of the federal and the national, which is to say of the states’-rights
and the liberal, approaches to constitutional interpretation.
Jefferson usually receives credit for the argument he offered, but he
borrowed it wholesale from Madison. Randolph’s resembled them both—
unsurprisingly, in light of Randolph’s role in the Richmond Ratification
Convention. Essentially, Jefferson began by saying that he understood the
Constitution’s underlying principle to be that, “The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” (He called this the
12th Amendment, as it would have been if the states had then ratified all
twelve of the proposed amendments pending before them. We know it as
the 10th.)
The states, as Jefferson had it, had created the Federal Government by
delegating it a few enumerated powers. In case it tried to exercise power not
delegated, he said, Congress’s act was essentially non-existent. He made
short shrift of the notions that the General Welfare Clause and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause gave Congress unenumerated power to enact that
Bank Bill. In regard to the latter clause, he pointed out that chartering a
bank was not necessary to the exercise of any of Congress’s enumerated
powers.
Hamilton replied to the opposite effect, just as his allies had done in
the House debate with Madison. Washington’s signature on the Bank Bill
erected the First Bank of the United States, but it did not write finis to
Jefferson’s cause.
Following as it did so close upon the heels of the Assumption contro-
versy, Hamilton’s Bank Bill spurred a growing feeling among certain politi-
cians, Madison and Jefferson prominent among them, that Hamilton had
21. For an explanation of the differences between Washington’s—the first six presidents’—
conception and ours, see generally RALPH KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE FIRST
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789–1829 (1984).
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ulterior motives. It seems to have been about this time that Madison shared
at least portions of his notes of the Philadelphia Convention, particularly the
notes of Hamilton’s June 18, 1787, speech proposing a new constitution for
the United States, with Jefferson. Thus, even before Hamilton took the anti-
Francophilic position in the debate culminating in President Washington’s
Neutrality Proclamation (1793), members of the budding Republican Party
had him pegged as a not-so-secret monarchist.
C.
At about this time, the Supreme Court got into the act. Chief Justice
Jay, Justice James Wilson, and other justices handed down the Court’s first
significant decision in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia (1793).22 The case
involved a South Carolina citizen’s suit against Georgia for money due a
decedent for whom the plaintiff served as executor. Georgia refused to ap-
pear, relying on a claim of sovereign immunity, but Jay and Wilson carried
the day with their seriatim opinions reasoning that someone had to have
jurisdiction over this type of case, and the Supreme Court was the obvious
institution to have it.
No sooner had this decision been made public than Congress hurriedly
drafted a constitutional amendment to negate it. The 11th Amendment by
its terms says only that federal courts will not have jurisdiction over this
type of litigation, but the underlying principle is greater: the Constitution is
a federal one, and federal courts, like Congress, can be given by Congress




Between the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm and the conclusion
of the ratification process in 1798, developments in foreign policy brought
the dispute over the locus of sovereignty in the American system to a head.
First, in response to a circular letter from Vice President Thomas Jeffer-
son’s congressman, Samuel Cabell, to his constituents, the federal grand
jury in Richmond handed up a presentment for seditious libel.23 Jefferson,
furious, quickly dashed off a petition for his Albemarle County, Virginia
neighbors calling upon the General Assembly to impeach the federal grand
jurors.
22. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
23. The story is laid out in detail in GUTZMAN, supra note 3, at 44–46.
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1.
Jefferson’s argument, familiar by now, was that the US Constitution
created a limited government with a few enumerated powers, and that
staunching the communication of ideas from a Virginia congressman to his
Virginia constituents was not among them. Besides, he added, the right to
communicate this way was inherent in the right of representation. It was
prior to the Constitution altogether. While vindicating Representative
Cabell’s rights was up to Congress, protecting Virginians’ right to commu-
nicate freely with their members of Congress against common Virginians
sitting on a federal grand jury was the state legislature’s responsibility. It
should impeach them and bar them from ever again holding office in
Virginia.
2.
Jefferson’s friend James Monroe had only recently entered upon the
gubernatorial office when Jefferson took up this cause. Sent the petition by
his former instructor in law, Monroe pointed out to Jefferson that this mat-
ter seemed more appropriately Congress’s than the General Assembly’s
concern. Jefferson conceded that this might commonly be true, but in such
an extreme case, when Congress could not be expected to intervene, ex-
treme measures were required. Ultimately, one house of the General As-
sembly agreed with Jefferson, but the other never did, and so his petition
did not rouse the Old Dominion’s government to assert its authority against
the US Government.
That would come the following year.
B.
Persuaded that organized opposition to its policies amounted to anti-
constitutional conspiracy, the Federalist Party in 1798 undertook to pass
four laws: an immigration reform and the Alien and Sedition Acts.24 The
first of them responded to newcomers’ tendency to jump onto the Jefferso-
nian bandwagon as soon as they arrived in America. As many of the 1790s’
new arrivals came either from Ireland or from Francophone Europe, this is
no surprise. Federalists responded to this trend by extending the period of
legal residency required prior to citizenship to fourteen years—still the
longest such period in American history.
The Alien and Sedition Acts took aim at Republicans as well. The first
of them, the Alien Enemies Act, gave the president authority to imprison or
expel hostile aliens. It remains in effect today, and it has been used numer-
ous times by several presidents, perhaps most notably by Democrat Frank-
lin Roosevelt in imprisoning Italians during World War II.
24. See GUTZMAN, supra note 5, at 113–134 (the Alien and Sedition Acts Crisis).
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The other two were far more controversial. First, the Alien Friends Act
empowered the president to identify and expel dangerous aliens. Second,
the Sedition Act joined its ban on sedition to a ban on saying anything that
tended to bring the Federal Government into ill repute.
C.
Republicans responded to this suite of laws by going further down the
road of state resistance than Jefferson had envisioned in his 1797 legislative
petition. Meeting at Monticello in summer 1798, the Virginia Republican
high command sketched out two sets of legislative resolutions explaining
why they held these laws unconstitutional and threatening to take additional
action if they were not repealed.25 One of those sets of resolutions, drafted
by Vice President Jefferson, made its way to Kentucky for adoption by that
state’s legislature. The other, drafted by former congressman Madison, be-
came the official position of the Virginia General Assembly.
1.
Jefferson’s resolutions began with the observation that he understood
the Constitution’s underlying principle to be that “[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” He went on
to say that the states entered into the federal union on the understanding that
the new government would have only the enumerated powers, and since
there was no superior power superintending the members of a federal union,
it remained for each state finally to ensure that the Constitution was being
properly observed by their creature: the Federal Government. In case it was
not, “a nullification is the rightful remedy,” he insisted. The Kentucky Leg-
islature found this last assertion a bridge too far in 1798. Still, the balance
of the Kentucky Resolutions made that state’s pugnacious posture clear.
2.
More importantly, Virginia adopted similar resolutions in 1798. We
sometimes forget how significant Virginia was in American politics in the
Constitution’s first decade. Suffice to say that besides being the home state
of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Randolph, et al., the Old Dominion
also accounted for 21 of the 138 members of the Electoral College, which
made it easily the most influential state (and accounts for its most promi-
nent politicians’ enduring national fame). (A state with the same share of
today’s Electoral College would have 83 electoral votes—one less than the
sum of California’s 55 and Florida’s 29.)
25. For a complete revisionist account of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, see id.
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Like the Kentucky Resolutions, the Virginia Resolutions were drafted
anonymously. This made sense in light of the Sedition Act. Not until ten
years later would John Taylor of Caroline, their House of Delegates spon-
sor, disclose in a public feud with a newspaper editor that not he, but
Madison was their draftsman. (Jefferson’s role in drafting Kentucky’s reso-
lutions remained secret longer still.)
Taylor took Madison’s draft and interlineated the claim that if the Fed-
eral Government adopted an unconstitutional and dangerous policy, it was
“null, void, and of no force or effect.” When Madison heard about this, he
acted to have that phrase excised. Scholars commonly say that this made
Virginia’s resolutions more moderate than Kentucky’s.26
They overlook the most obvious evidence: the record of the debate in
the House of Delegates. Rather than deleting the offending language lest the
document be too radical for Madison’s taste, the majority Republicans ac-
cepted James Barbour’s argument that to make this change could not hurt
anything, because the resolutions would still refer to the Alien and Sedition
Acts as “unconstitutional,” and that was the same as “null, void, and of no
force or effect.” Even Taylor, who for years had been calling on Jefferson,
Madison, and James Monroe to use the General Assembly as a mechanism
for resisting federal overreaching, went along. In short, the change was not
understood by the Virginia Resolutions’ sponsors as making the document
less confrontational at all.
Besides using the word “unconstitutional,” which the resolutions’ pro-
ponents held to be interchangeable with “null, void, and of no force or ef-
fect,” the third Virginia resolution said that in case the Federal Government
adopted an unconstitutional and dangerous policy, states could prevent its
enforcement within their “respective” territories. What means the states
would use to achieve this end, the General Assembly did not say. They did
say that in such a situation, “the states have the right, and are in duty bound,
to interpose.”
Decades later, in the throes of the Nullification Crisis, James Madison
explained these resolutions as rather inoffensive.27 Pace the South Carolina
Nullifiers, he held, Virginia had in 1798 never said that an individual state
could act to thwart federal policy. “Interposition” meant no more than
adopting resolutions or voting Republican.
3.
Recent scholarship has proven dispositively that this is untrue: in re-
sponse to Virginia’s and Kentucky’s call, Georgia adopted a resolution of
26. For contemporary scholars’ handling (ignoring) of the evidence, see GUTZMAN, supra
note 3, at 53–54.
27. See generally Kevin R. Gutzman, A Troublesome Legacy: James Madison and “The
Principles of ‘98”, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 569 (1995).
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its own declaring that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional.28
In the course of casting its constitutional judgment, the Georgia Legislature
added that it hoped this would be enough, and it would not have to inter-
pose. Clearly, then, interposition was not resolving or voting.
The Tennessee Legislature responded positively to the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 as well, like Georgia adopting a resolution
holding the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional. One house of the
North Carolina Legislature voted to endorse Virginia’s, while the other
disagreed.
4.
From north of Virginia, however, the response was entirely negative.
Most forceful in their rejection of Republican principles were Massachu-
setts and its little brother Connecticut, which held that they liked the Alien
and Sedition Acts, they wished the laws had been passed sooner, and they
hoped to see additional prosecutions. Among the constitutional points they
made, pride of place went to the claim that not state legislatures, but federal
courts had the authority to pass on important constitutional issues.
5.
The Virginia Republicans decided not to let these negative assessments
of their case go unanswered. For Kentucky, Jefferson sketched out a new
set of resolutions refuting Federalist legislatures’ criticisms. Along the way,
these Kentucky Resolutions of 1799 said that Kentucky loved the federal
union and would be among the last to secede. While prominent Virginia
congressman William Branch Giles had floated that idea in public in 1798,
no official document contemplated the possibility before 1799.
Meanwhile, back in the Old Dominion, James Madison decided to
leave his years-long political retirement—not for a new seat in Congress,
but for a place in the House of Delegates. His two-year tenure there would
have three significant products: 1) a new law establishing winner-take-all
allocation of Virginia’s Electoral College votes; 2) election of his and Jef-
ferson’s close ally James Monroe as Virginia’s governor heading into the
election of 1800 (Virginia governors were under George Mason’s 1776
constitution elected by the legislature); and 3) an extended refutation of
Federalists’ constitutional position, the Report of 1800.29
In general, “Madison’s Report” (as it came to be known) applied Jef-
fersonian constitutional principles to the entire record of Federalist Party
administration since George Washington’s inauguration in 1789. The Bank
28. See generally WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT: THE EARLY SU-
PREME COURT JUSTICES, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798, AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSENT
(2016).
29. GUTZMAN, supra note 5, at 276.
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Bill, the Neutrality Proclamation, the Alien and Sedition Acts, and more
besides find their place in Madison’s carefully reasoned demolition of the
opposing party. Most significant is what he says about ratification.
In response to Federalist assertions that the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions erred in stating that the states ratified the Constitution, because
the people did, Madison carefully explained what the two states meant. The
word “state,” he said, is susceptible of several different definitions. It could
refer to a state’s territory, say, or to its government. It also might refer to
the sovereign people of the state, as when Article VII held that, “The ratifi-
cation of the conventions of nine states, shall be sufficient for the establish-
ment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same.” Virginia
and Kentucky had used the word in that sense in 1798, and Madison—
Virginia—was frankly surprised to find other states disputing their claim
that the states ratified the Constitution.
D.
Meanwhile, former treasury secretary Alexander Hamilton counseled
that the army be used to intimidate Virginia Republicans from resisting the
law and the federal judiciary enforced the Sedition Act with a vengeance.30
More than one Supreme Court justice riding circuit went to great pains to
encourage local federal grand and petit juries to apply the law with vigor.
Several significant Republicans went to prison and paid stiff fines under the
law, including a congressman.31
1.
The congressman, Matthew Lyon of Vermont, was charged with sedi-
tion for “uttering political opinions critical of President Adams and the Fed-
eralist administration” during the 1798 election campaign, as the chief
authority on the matter put it.32 Lyon argued in his own defense that the
Sedition Act was unconstitutional, that the matter for which he was accused
had been written before the Act’s adoption, that he had not published any of
the things allegedly violative of the Act with the requisite “bad intent,” and
that everything he was accused of saying was true—and thus fell under the
Act’s truth exception.
In his charge, Justice William Paterson instructed the jury that the
question of constitutionality was not for a jury. The issues before them were
whether Lyon had said the things he stood accused of saying and whether
30. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick (Feb. 2, 1799), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/02-11-02-0267.
31. See generally PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE FREE PRESS CRISIS OF 1800: THOMAS
COOPER’S TRIAL FOR SEDITIOUS LIBEL (2011); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROBLEMS (1973); JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956).
32. SMITH, supra note 31, at 231.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 22 30-MAR-18 12:55
2018] JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS V. FEDERALIST COURTS 77
he had done so with the requisite bad intent. Lyon conceded the first point,
Paterson continued, and that left only the second.
Along the way, Paterson also intimated that some of the evidence sub-
mitted by Lyon—a letter by the poet Joel Barlow—was forged. So fine a
poet could not have written such a letter, he asserted. Nothing Paterson said
even hinted at the idea that political opposition could be legitimate, the fact
that truth was expressly made a defense by the Sedition Act itself, or that
acquittal was possible. Lyon’s conviction gave Paterson the opportunity to
impose a sentence of four months’ imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, besides
assessing $60.96 in court costs. On hearing of it, Vice President Jefferson
told John Taylor of Caroline, “I know not which mortifies me most, that I




In another notorious case, prominent intellectual Thomas Cooper
found himself thrown into prison for having dared to impugn the Adams
Administration.34 A notable Cooper newspaper editorial began by accusing
the Federalists of trying “to stretch to the utmost the constitutional authority
of our Executive, and to introduce the political evils of those European gov-
ernments whose principles we have rejected.” He went on to say that if he
were a president who desired to undermine the Constitution, he would grab
at the states’ reserved power to undermine the federal principle and wage a
verbal battle with any state government or official who resisted this cam-
paign. Public critics of federal officials would themselves be criticized, he
would employ laws against libel and sedition to this purpose, and all critics
would be labelled “as dangerous and seditious, as disturbers of the peace of
society, and desirous of overturning the Constitution.”
His chief “instrument of despotic ambition,” however, would be “a
standing army . . . and a naval armament.” History showed, after all, that
“in no instance whatever has a standing army, regularly maintained, failed
of rendering the governing powers independent of the people.” Not least
among the “positive” effects of such a military would be the desuetude of
the militia, which were the people’s chief instrument of self-defense. Be-
sides that, such an establishment would give the president offices and con-
tracts for his friends to go with the means of suppressing his enemies.
President John Adams, according to Cooper, was not his target—
though Adams had attacked popular sovereignty, free principles, and the
33. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (Nov. 26, 1798), https://founders.archives
.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-30-02-0398.
34. My account of the Cooper matter relies on SMITH, supra note 31, at 307–333 and
HOFFER, supra note 31.
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rights of man. Expansion of the army and navy and enactment of the Alien
and Sedition Acts, he concluded, should spur Americans to resist.35
When he learned of Cooper’s essay, President Adams wrote that, “As
far as it alludes to me, I despise it; but I have no doubt it is a libel against
the whole government, and as such ought to be prosecuted.” Cooper was
not prosecuted at that point, but Adams was now aware of him. Soon
enough, an answer to Cooper’s attack saw print. It included the fact that
Cooper had applied to Adams for a political appointment in 1797—a fact
that could only have come from Adams.
b.
Cooper replied in a handbill which would become the basis of his
prosecution under the Sedition Act. He said that in his application to Adams
he made clear that he was a Republican and would remain so. He added that
there was nothing untoward in a Republican’s applying to Adams for a
public post at that time, as Adams had not yet signed an Alien Act depriv-
ing certain people of trial by jury or a Sedition Act screening his public
behavior from criticism. “Nor were we yet saddled with the expense of a
permanent navy, or threatened under his auspices with the existence of a
standing army,” Cooper continued.
Turning to a notorious legal matter, Cooper said:
Mr. Adams had not yet . . . interfered as president of the
United States to influence the decisions of a Court of Justice. A
stretch of authority which the Monarch of Great Britain would
have shrunk from; an interference without precedent, against law
and against mercy! This melancholy case of Jonathan Robins, a
native citizen of America, forcibly impressed by the British and
delivered up with the advice of Mr. Adams to the mock trial of a
British court martial, had not yet astonished the republican citi-
zens of this free country.
c.
Cooper was arrested on April 9, 1800 and charged with seditious li-
bel—one authority says at President Adams’ insistence.36 Cooper requested
that the president be subpoenaed so that Cooper could show that Adams
was responsible for the publication to which Cooper had had to reply with
the negative public characterizations of Adams’ behavior, which Cooper
intended to use as proof he had not manifested the requisite mental state to
violate the law. Justice Samuel Chase refused to issue a subpoena to Presi-
dent Adams, holding that Cooper had no right to make him appear. Chase
also refused to grant Cooper an extension of time to obtain copies of Ad-
35. For Cooper’s argument, see SMITH, supra note 31, at 308–309.
36. HOFFER, supra note 31, at 80.
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ams’ correspondence related to the XYZ Affair, which had been the subject
of some of Cooper’s criticism of Adams. Chase explained that Cooper
should have been more careful than to make charges against the president
he could not prove.
Chase allowed Secretary of State Pickering to sit on the judges’ bench
during Cooper’s trial. Perhaps he knew that Pickering had instigated the
prosecution. Other members of Adams’ Cabinet also attended, as did Rep.
Robert Goodloe Harper, the author of the Sedition Act’s relevant section.
The prosecutor, William Rawle, had also prosecuted the Whiskey Rebels
and John Fries in the Federal Government’s only previous treason trials.
Rawle argued that allowing criticism of government such as Cooper had
leveled would lead to insurrection.
Cooper made two arguments in his own defense: first, that his asser-
tions had all been true, which brought them under the statute’s truth de-
fense; and second, that because his argument had begun by disclaiming the
idea that Adams had any improper motive, Cooper’s intention could not
have been to spur opposition to the government. His argument, Cooper in-
sisted, had been solely political. Besides that, Cooper insisted, he had only
entered the lists in this connection at all because the newspaper article in-
cluding Adams’ information had accused Cooper of a “base and cowardly
slander.”
Cooper attempted to call two character witnesses to show that he was
not the type to commit the crime of which he stood accused. Justice Chase
interrupted him. “This is not necessary,” the judge said, “It is your conduct
not your character that is in question. If this prosecution were for a crime
against the United States, you might give evidence to your character and
show that you have always been a good citizen, but this is an indictment for
a libel against the President, where your general character is not in ques-
tion.” Chase was wrong: the charge was a crime against the United States,
not against the president. Still, Cooper did not press the point.37
In his charge to the jury, Justice Chase essentially assumed Cooper’s
guilt. The statute required that the government prove the publications to be
false, scandalous, and malicious, but Chase said the government had proven
Cooper’s bad intent. “He justified the publication in all its parts,” Chase
told the jury, “and declares it to be founded in truth.” Perversely, Chase
turned Cooper’s strategy of using the law’s provision concerning the inno-
cence of truthful statements against Cooper.38
Besides that, Cooper had said of his publication that it would inform
the people of Adams’ intentions before the next election. This, Justice
Chase intoned, showed that Cooper intended his publication to turn the peo-
ple against the president in time for him to suffer an election defeat.
37. Id. at 106–107.
38. SMITH, supra note 31, at 325–326.
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In conclusion, Chase called Cooper’s publication a “gross attack” on
Adams: “Take this publication in all its parts,” he said, “and it is the boldest
attempt I have known to poison the minds of the people. . . . This publica-
tion is evidently intended to mislead the ignorant, and inflame their minds
against the President, and to influence their votes on the next election.”
Thus instructed, the jury quickly found Cooper guilty. In light of Chase’s
performance, the crime seems to have been intending to make President
Adams look like a worse presidential candidate than Vice President
Jefferson.
Justice Chase was not done with Cooper yet. In the sentencing phase
of the trial, he told Cooper that although he typically did not fine a man
more than he was able to pay, in this case suspicion that other Republicans
(whom he called the party “against the government”) would help raise the
money for his fine led Chase to require that Cooper pay $2,000. When
District Judge Richard Peters objected that party considerations should not
affect the convicted man’s penalty, Chase put the question off. In the end,
Cooper was fined $400 and made to post a $2,000 surety bond. In addition,
he would be imprisoned for six months.
3.
a.
The most attention-grabbing case under the Sedition Act, however,
was the Richmond trial of journeyman muckraker James Callender. Cal-
lender published a book, The Prospect Before Us, replete with caustic as-
persions upon John Adams. Having read it while riding circuit, Justice
Chase told an attorney in Maryland that he “would carry it to Richmond as
a proper subject for prosecution,” that “before he left Richmond he would
teach the people to distinguish between liberty and licentiousness of the
press,” and “that if the Commonwealth or its inhabitants were not too de-
praved to furnish a jury of good and respectable men, he would certainly
punish Callender.”39
En route to Richmond, Chase encountered a stranger, James Triplett.
According to Triplett, Chase showed him the book and inquired of his
knowledge, if any, concerning Callender. Triplett testified that he had told
Chase of a rumor that Callender had been arrested for vagrancy, and that
Chase replied, “it is a pity you have not hanged the rascal.” (“Rascal” in the
late eighteenth century was an extreme epithet the use of which sometimes
led to duels.) The Federal Government, Chase continued, showed “too
much leniency towards such renegadoes.” A couple of days later, encoun-
tering Justice Chase in the Richmond courthouse, Triplett learned from
Chase that he would have “the pleasure of seeing Callender” the next day.
39. BERGER, supra note 31, at 232 et seq.
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That was when the trial began. It could have begun later, but Chase
denied Callender the continuance his counsel requested. In doing so, Chase
laid down the rule that an author before publishing should have documents
and out-of-state (in this case, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and western
Virginia) witnesses at hand. Chase stated in denying the continuance that
“the ordinary sittings of the court would be too short for him to obtain
witnesses from so great a distance . . . he [Chase] could not allow him
[Callender] to the next term.”40
b.
Chase’s abusive conduct continued into the trial. When counsel for
Callender called former senator John Taylor of Caroline to the witness
stand, Chase immediately intervened to ask what he hoped to prove by the
witness, saying, “No evidence is admissible that does not go to justify the
whole charge.” Called to comment on the matter at Chase’s impeachment
trial, the very pro-Chase witness Chief Justice John Marshall said that he
had never encountered this idea before. In fact, the idea was completely
contrary to the law of evidence.41
Chase also levelled serious aspersions against Callender’s counsel dur-
ing the trial. At one point, he said that these “young gentlemen” were offer-
ing “a popular argument, calculated to deceive the people, but very
incorrect . . . . [Y]ou have all along mistaken the law, and impress your
mistakes upon the court.” One struggles to conceive how a judge could
more seriously undermine counsel’s impression upon the jury than by first
accusing them of attempting to deceive the jury and then asserting that they
had a mistaken understanding of the law. Chase also mocked defense coun-
sel consistently. Chase’s counsel conceded at his impeachment trial that
Chase had displayed “mirth,” “humor,” and “facetiousness” at the trial.
John Taylor of Caroline, who was an attorney, testified that Chase’s humor
had been “extremely well calculated to abash and disconcert counsel.”
Chase also interrupted them continuously, so that the clerk of court and
defense counsel all later testified that his behavior had in this regard been
highly unusual.42
In the end, Callender’s lawyers quit the case.
c.
Raoul Berger concludes his indictment of Chase by noting that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 included both a statutory injunction to administer
justice impartially and a requirement that justices of the Supreme Court
40. Id. at 236 n.56.
41. Id. at 236–238; Testimony in the Trial of Samuel Chase, in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MAR-
SHALL 354 (Charles F. Hobson, et al. eds., 1990).
42. BERGER, supra note 31, at 244–246.
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swear to do so. Chase entered upon the Callender matter with a strong
prejudice, conducted the proceedings in a prejudiced manner, and seated
petit jurors who confessed they were biased against the defendant.43
Ultimately, Chase got his conviction. He sentenced Callender to nine
months in prison and a $200 fine, then bound him over to good behavior for
two years.44
VII.
Federalist judges’ enthusiastic enforcement of the Alien and Sedition
Acts accounts in large part for the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of
1798, Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, and Virginia Report of 1800, besides
the associated resolutions of the Tennessee and Georgia legislatures. Al-
though they implored people in other states to join in protesting Federalist
constitutional abuses, Jeffersonians believed that the political fever would
pass soon after the taxman made clear exactly how much Federalist military
preparations cost.45
They proved right. John Adams and his congressional allies lost the
1800 elections. They still had more than four months in office, however,
and they made the most of it by passing the Judiciary Act of 1801. That law
significantly expanded the judiciary just in time for the repudiated President
John Adams and his fellow repudiated Federalists in the Senate to fill the
new judicial posts with Federalists.46 Tipping their hand, the Act’s authors
also prospectively cut the Supreme Court’s size from six to five—obviously
so that Thomas Jefferson would not get to replace the first Federalist to
retire from that tribunal during his presidential tenure.47
A.
The new Republican Congress addressed that hated law with its Re-
peal Act of 1802. Congressional deliberations and public discussion of the
Repeal Act featured abundant Republican aspersions upon federal judges,
including both lamentations of their biased behavior and denunciations of
them for their indiscretions.48
43. Id. at 238.
44. HENRY H. SIMMS, LIFE OF JOHN TAYLOR: THE STORY OF A BRILLIANT LEADER IN THE
EARLY VIRGINIA STATE RIGHTS SCHOOL 98 (1932).
45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor of Caroline (Nov. 26, 1798), in 30 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 JANUARY 1798–31 JANUARY 1799, at 588–590 (Barbara B.
Oberg., ed., 2003), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-30-02-0398.
46. Well, not entirely with Federalists. See Richard A. Samuelson, The Midnight Appoint-
ments of John Adams, 7 WHITE HOUSE HIST. 14, 14–25 (2000).
47. See generally R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT 152–153 (2001).
48. Id. at 153.
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The Republicans’ counter-reformation of the federal judiciary raised a
substantial constitutional question in the minds of the Federalists.49 That
question, foremost plank of a petition presented to Congress by eleven of
the circuit judges appointed under the Judiciary Act of 1801, was whether
abolishing judicial positions did not violate Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution, which famously guarantees federal judges tenure “during
good behaviour.”
B.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most forceful surviving argument by a fed-
eral judge for the law’s unconstitutionality came from Justice Chase.50 In a
lengthy missive to his colleague Marshall, Chase insisted that the Supreme
Court should void the law as unconstitutional. “The distinction of taking the
Office from the Judge, and not the Judge from the Office, I consider as
puerile, and nonsensical,” he confided. Since there were circuit judges al-
ready, then, justices could not now ride circuit. Chase added that on consid-
ering the matter, he would have thought it unconstitutional for the justices
to resume riding circuit even without the imbroglio over the Judiciary Act
of 1801; it seemed that the Constitution intended for inferior courts and the
Supreme Court to be staffed with different judges.
C.
Marshall tended to agree with Chase’s argument concerning riding cir-
cuit in coming sessions, though reluctantly.51 In fact, after hearing from
Justice Bushrod Washington that he disagreed with Chase and him, Mar-
shall decided that “policy dictate[d]” acquiescence in the new organization
of the judiciary.52 Soon enough, Justice Paterson passed along the news that
Justice William Cushing would willingly ride circuit if the rest did.53 Chase
was outvoted.54
Ultimately, in Stuart v. Laird (1803), the Court upheld the Repeal Act.
It did so on the basis of a very broad reading of Congress’s Article III,
Section 2, clause 2 power to structure the Judiciary. Having justices ride
circuit, Justice William Paterson (a chief author of both Article III and the
Judiciary Act of 1789) intoned, lay within Congress’s constitutional discre-
tion. Years of precedent had settled the question. When Congress un-
49. See id. at 154–157.
50. See Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL 109–115 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1990).
51. See Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (Apr. 19, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 50, at 108–109.
52. Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (May 3, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 50, at 117.
53. See Letter from William Paterson to John Marshall (June 18, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 50, at 121.
54. See id.
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limbered its impeachment guns against the Federalist judiciary, it would not
be over this question.
VIII.
Stuart v. Laird was handed down six days after Marbury v. Madison
(1803).55 If Marshall’s court kept its collective head down in the former
case, it levelled a heavy broadside against President Jefferson and his chief
advisor and ally in the latter.56
A.
Looking back on his career from the vantage of retirement, Jefferson
explained the situation giving rise to Marbury.57 Upon taking office, he
said, he had found a stack of judicial commissions awaiting delivery in the
State Department. He immediately decided not to deliver them. The Judici-
ary Act of 1801 offended his constitutional (not to mention, one imagines,
his partisan) sensibilities, and so he would not do so.
Nor, indeed, did Jefferson think he had to. A deed was not valid until
delivered, he reasoned, and so those commissions were not vested until re-
ceived. If he kept them, the appointees would never obtain a right to their
offices. This account is tinged with resentment, for John Marshall’s opinion
in the case reasoned to precisely contrary effect.58
B.
Where nowadays a federal suit begins with jurisdictional pleading,
Marshall in his opinion for the Court took up the merits of the case first,
then at last came to the jurisdictional issue. This gave him the opportunity
to unburden himself of a stinging lecture concerning the equities of the
matter.59
According to Marshall, the Constitution established a two-part system
for appointment to judicial office: first the president nominated a candidate,
and then the Senate gave its consent. In the case of William Marbury and
his fellow complainants, Robert T. Hooe and Dennis Ramsay, both parts
had been performed.60 Marbury, said the chief justice, had a right to the
petty office he wanted.
55. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803).
56. Except where noted, the following account of Marbury is based on KEVIN R. C.
GUTZMAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 285–287 (2012).
57. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), https://founders.ar
chives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-0734.
58. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1919).
59. Id.
60. For the co-complainants, see Charles F. Hobson, Editorial Note to 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL supra note 50, at 160–164.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 30 30-MAR-18 12:55
2018] JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS V. FEDERALIST COURTS 85
Was there a legal remedy for a situation in which a right had vested
but a high executive official—in this case, Secretary of State James
Madison—refused to deliver the commission? There was: a writ of
mandamus.
Rather than ordering that it be delivered, however, Marshall said that
Congress had erred in assigning the Supreme Court the task of hearing suits
for mandamus in matters such as this. Hearing such cases as original mat-
ters did not fall under the Constitution’s enumeration of types of cases in
which the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction. There was noth-
ing that any court could do about the problem.
We do not know what collaborative process led to the issuance of this
type of opinion, but we do know that Marshall here promulgated an opinion
akin to his several opinions decried by Jefferson as “not belonging to the
case often, but sought for out of it, as if to rally the public opinion before-
hand to their [the justices’] views, and to indicate the line they [the public]
are to walk in.”61 Jefferson no doubt felt vindicated by Marshall’s perform-
ance in his decision not to deliver the commissions to Marbury and his
fellows.
Besides that, Marshall ought to have recused himself. The suit cen-
tered on an omission of his while secretary of state—his non-delivery of the
three appointees’ commissions. At issue, as a moral if not as a legal matter,
was whether, as he said he thought, an appointment became effective when
the Senate consented to it or when, as President Jefferson thought, the ap-
pointee received his commission. Marshall told his brother at the time, “to
withhold the commission of the Justices is an act of which I entertained no
suspicion.”62
A federal court could issue an opinion and claim a power—in this
case, of judicial review. It could also issue a stinging lecture to the highest
officials in the Executive Branch. What it could not do was to take on Con-




So, early in 1803, the House of Representatives voted to impeach a
New Hampshire district judge named John Pickering. The unfortunate Pick-
ering, it was said, had committed dereliction of duty by routinely turning up
inebriated in court. In some cases, Pickering’s judicial behavior had been
completely arbitrary, to the great detriment of parties before him. So, for
example, the ship Eliza was seized by the government for infraction of the
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), as reprinted in KEVIN R.
C. GUTZMAN, THOMAS JEFFERSON—REVOLUTIONARY 76 (2017).
62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), supra note 57.
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law, and without hearing the government’s evidence, Pickering ordered that
the ship be turned over to its captain. He then refused to allow that his
ruling be appealed. All the while, he impressed all those present as not in
his right mind.63
In the Senate, what looked likely to be a routine case turned out to be
somewhat complicated. First, Pickering’s counsel submitted a letter from
Pickering’s son saying that the judge was not a drunkard, he was senile.64
Second, the Pickering forces argued that whatever one might think of
drunkenness or senility in a judge, it was not “treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors,” i.e., constitutional grounds for impeachment.65
Pickering’s counsel here helped establish what now seems an immor-
tal, incorrect understanding of constitutional text. “High crimes and misde-
meanors,” they argued, are misdeeds indictable at common law.66 Although
the Senate did not state its grounds for removing Pickering from his office,
this argument would echo in all subsequent Senate impeachment trials.
B.
1.
Having removed Pickering, the House decided it had bigger fish to fry.
The idea came from President Jefferson, who wrote one of the Republican
leaders of the House, Joseph H. Nicholson, to complain of Chase’s behavior
on circuit. Referring to a grand jury charge in which Chase had denigrated
various recent legal reforms in Maryland and cast aspersions upon Jefferson
himself, Jefferson asked, “Ought this seditious and official attack upon the
principles of our Constitution, and on the proceedings of a State, to go un-
punished? And to whom so pointedly as yourself will the public look for the
necessary measures?”67 Then, striking a characteristic disinterested pose, he
added, “I ask these questions for your consideration. For myself, it is better
that I should not interfere.”68
2.
Immediately upon Pickering’s conviction, then, Nicholson’s close ally
Representative John Randolph of Roanoke (R-VA) moved articles of im-
peachment against Justice Chase. Those articles asserted that Chase had
committed high crimes and misdemeanors by abusing his office in matters
63. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 127 (1992).
64. 13 Annals of Cong. 328–329 (1804).
65. Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HIST. REV. 3, 485–507
(1949).
66. Id.
67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph H. Nicholson (May 13, 1803), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-40-02-0278.
68. 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801–1805, at 467 (1970);
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph H. Nicholson (May 13, 1803), supra note 67.
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such as his conduct of the Callender trial and the Cooper trial. He had made
no secret of being a partisan judge, either in the political sense or in the
judicial sense, but instead had predetermined cases’ outcomes and ram-
paged beyond the bounds of proper judicial behavior along the way.
In the Cooper case, Chase charged the jury that anyone who “attempts
to destroy the confidence of the people in their officers . . . effectually saps
the foundation of the government.”69 As the Republicans feared, Chase’s
behavior seemed calculated to make free elections impossible. How, after
all, would any of our recent federal elections have looked if criticism of
incumbent officials had been banned? What would be the point of the
Speech and Press Clauses if they did not protect expression of political
opinion?
The standard account of the Chase trial holds that Randolph, who was
not an attorney, was outclassed at the Senate bar by the all-star roster of
Federalist lawyers who argued for Chase’s acquittal. Their chief contention
was the same as Pickering’s lawyers’ chief argument on Pickering’s behalf:
that whatever one might say about their client’s performance of his judicial
duties, it did not amount to treason or bribery, and it was not a “high crime
or misdemeanor.”
Here, Berger objects strenuously. A high crime is not a crime, he
shows from extensive English precedents, and a high misdemeanor is not a
misdemeanor. The point of the impeachment clauses is not to ensure that
pickpocket presidents or judges can be removed from office. Rather, they
are Congress’s mechanism for policing the constitutional behavior of the
other two branches. One would be hard-pressed, however, to read Justice
Chase’s acquittal as anything other than a license for all but the most abu-
sive official behavior by Article III federal judges. In fact, none has ever
been impeached for anything other than a crime since. Berger concludes
that Chase’s “removal would have served as a standing reminder that there
is no room on our bench for an implacably prejudiced judge, and . . . his
factional acquittal was a miscarriage of justice.”70
3.
The Chase acquittal disgusted President Jefferson. Despite Hamilton’s
promise in The Federalist No. 79 that good behavior tenure was safe, be-
cause Congress could impeach wrongdoers, the impeachment provisions,
Jefferson said, were “not even a scare-crow.”71
69. BERGER, supra note 31, at 250–251.
70. Id. at 234.
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1987); Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), supra note 56 (for examples of Thomas
Jefferson’s repeated use of this metaphor).
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X.
A.
The next confrontation between the Jeffersonians and the Federalist
judges arose out of the apostasy of one of Jefferson’s chief allies, his first-
term vice president, Aaron Burr. Having refrained in 1801 from stating that
due to voters’ expectations, Jefferson, not he, ought to be chosen president
by the House of Representatives, Burr was maneuvered out of his high
standing in the party by the middle of his vice-presidential term. Looking to
rehabilitate himself, he ran for governor of New York. Out of that decision
arose the sequence of events whose result was Burr’s shooting of Alexander
Hamilton.72
Under indictment in two states, Burr served out his term—including
presiding over the Chase impeachment trial. He then seems to have been at
the center of a scheme to filibuster in Mexico, if not to form a new country
including part of Mexico and part of the Louisiana Territory. Persuaded that
Burr intended to use force to overthrow the American government in at
least some of the lands whose acquisition was Jefferson’s outstanding presi-
dential achievement, the president sent for Burr to be arrested and trans-
ported back to Richmond, Virginia for a treason trial.73
B.
Jefferson’s behavior in connection with the supposed Burr Conspiracy
and the treason trial marked a low point in his political career. Why he was
so certain of his quarry’s guilt, we do not know. His pre-trial public procla-
mation of Burr’s guilt is inexcusable. That he claimed a right to disobey the
law cannot be denied. He did however comply with Marshall’s subpoena
duces tecum, and nothing other than his own sense of constitutional propri-
ety made him.
For his part, Burr used all of his considerable legal expertise in fight-
ing for acquittal.74 While he had prominent legal counsel, he managed the
defense himself. The marshal assembled quite an eminent group of potential
jurors, though it was not to Burr’s liking. When Burr objected to the pres-
ence of William Branch Giles and Wilson Cary Nicholas—both sometime
Jeffersonian US senators—on the jury, the prosecution agreed to their with-
drawal. Burr predictably had no trouble with Marshall’s selection of Mar-
shall’s friend and cousin John Randolph of Roanoke, formerly US House
Jeffersonian leader but now Tertium Quid anti-Jeffersonian schismatic, as
foreman.
72. See generally NANCY ISENBERG, FALLEN FOUNDER: THE LIFE OF AARON BURR (2007).
73. See R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR (2012).
74. The following paragraph relies in part upon 5 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESI-
DENT: SECOND TERM, 1805–1809, at 311 (1974).
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C.
It was during the pre-trial maneuvering that Burr requested his sub-
poena. This elicited substantial argument, much of it in the form of gratui-
tous attacks on Jefferson. Jefferson’s most eminent biographer, who is
usually a rather gentle Jefferson admirer, holds that Marshall should have
intervened to cut off this kind of disputation sooner.75 In the course of rul-
ing in favor of Burr’s request, Marshall said that of course the president
could reply, as his labors obviously were not unremitting (he retired to
Monticello in the summers), and that Jefferson had a “wish” to see Burr
convicted, which caused howls of rage from the prosecution.76 One attorney
on the prosecution team reported to Jefferson that Marshall had afterwards
expressed regret for this statement.77
Jefferson replied soon enough that he and all of the relevant members
of his administration stood ready to respond by affidavit or production of
required documents, insofar as the national interest allowed their disclosure,
to the process of the circuit court. What they could not do, he added, was
attend the various Burr-related court proceedings in Richmond, the Missis-
sippi Territory, and St. Louis: the Constitution wisely contemplated that the
Executive Branch would be always in session.78
When Jefferson learned that Burr had raised the issue of Jefferson’s
partial compliance with the subpoena duces tecum, the president wrote to
the attorney general reminding him that at Monticello in the summer, he
continued the work of the presidency, and noting that he had taken steps to
retrieve relevant correspondence not then in his possession. Apparently,
Marshall’s snide remark about the presidency as a part-time job rankled.79
D.
On July 14, Jefferson wrote to his friend Pierre du Pont de Nemours
describing the Burr trial. “Altho’ there is not a man in the U.S. who is not
satisfied of the depth of his guilt, such are the jealous provisions of our laws
in favor of the accused, and against the accuser, that I question if he can be
convicted.”80 That such a man could be tried, he said, reflected the “innate
strength” of the American government.
The accuracy of Jefferson’s appraisal of public opinion is reflected by
the fact that ninety-six potential jurors had to be questioned before twelve
were impaneled, and even some of the twelve said they were suspicious of
75. Id. at 318.
76. Id. at 319.
77. Id. at 320.
78. Id. at 322.
79. Id. at 333.
80. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Pierre du Pont de Nemours (July 14, 1807), as reprinted
in 5 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805–1809, at 334 (1974).
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Burr’s behavior.81 “Before an impartial jury,” Jefferson told one of the
prosecutors, “Burr’s conduct would convict himself, were not one word of
testimony to be offered against him. But to what state will our law be re-
duced by party feelings in those who administer it?”82
E.
Marshall essentially decided the case before submitting it to the jury.
He held that since the Constitution’s definition of “treason” included “levy-
ing war against” the United States, mere assembly of men, even if with that
intention, did not suffice.83 Rather, they had to have been armed. The as-
sembled conspirators in this matter had not been armed, and so testimony
concerning their behavior in assembling and when assembling was not ad-
missible into evidence. Besides that, the chief justice said that Burr would
have had to be present among the assembled, constructively present among
them, or the procurer of the assemblage to be responsible for it. If the last,
there would have to be two witnesses to his procuring it. The prosecution
could not clear this hurdle.84 Thus instructed, the jury returned the ex-
tremely unusual verdict of, “We of the jury say that Aaron Burr is not
proved to be guilty under this indictment by any evidence submitted to us.
We therefore find him not guilty.”85 Despite the Burr lawyers’ protest, Mar-
shall accepted this, entering a verdict of “Not Guilty.”86
Jefferson, appalled, wrote to the chief prosecutor asking him to pre-
serve the evidence.87 Congress would be informed, so that it could decide
whether any “defect” was “in the evidence of guilt, or in the law, or in the
application of the law.”88 Thus informed, it could take corrective measures.
He soon wrote to James Wilkinson predicting that Congress would amend
the Constitution to establish a means for it to correct a misbehaving judge.89
81. 5 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805–1809, at 334
(1974).
82. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (Aug. 20, 1807), as reprinted in 5 DUMAS
MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805–1809, at 335 (1974); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (Aug. 20, 1807), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jeffer
son/99-01-02-6225.
83. See 5 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805–1809, at 338
(1974).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 339.
86. Id.
87. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (Sept. 4, 1807), https://founders.ar
chives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-6320.
88. Id.
89. MALONE, supra note 68, at 339–340 (1974); see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Wilkinson, (Sept. 20, 1807), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-6415.
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XI.
A.
Republican hostility to Marshall and his colleagues continued to sim-
mer through the first decade of the nineteenth century and into the second.
The next flashpoint of confrontation came in the second half of that decade
and the beginning of the following one, when the classic cases of Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee (1816), Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), McCul-
loch v. Maryland (1819), and Cohens v. Virginia (1821) highlighted the




Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee arose out of a title dispute in northern Vir-
ginia. Marshall, an interested party, recused himself, and so James Madison
appointee Justice Joseph Story wrote the Court’s opinion. It could as well
have been written by Marshall. Indeed, one would be unsurprised to learn
that Story had consulted Marshall in writing it—though the Massachusetts
justice could well have written it himself.91
The Supreme Court had met with overt resistance from the Virginia
Court of Appeals (today’s Supreme Court of Virginia), which refused to
cooperate in a Supreme Court review of its ruling. Chief Judge Spencer
Roane, a son-in-law of Patrick Henry and long-time Jeffersonian activist,
insisted for his court that Congress had no right to empower the Supreme
Court to hear the case.92 Virginia’s courts were not subordinate to the Su-
preme Court, he wrote, but a parallel system. Judges on the Court of Ap-
peals swore to uphold the US Constitution, and they did so.
2.
Perhaps predictably, the justices disagreed. Story said that Section 25
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court appellate juris-
90. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
91. If, as Jefferson thought, the goal of a judicial appointment was to push forward the ap-
pointing president’s constitutional views, Madison’s appointment of Story may rank as the worst
appointment in history. Jefferson warned his friend not to make it, but Madison went ahead. See
generally KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 313 (2012).
92. For Roane’s relationship to his colleague St. George Tucker, see generally PHILLIP HAM-
ILTON, THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY FAMILY (2003). See also F. THORN-
TON MILLER, JUDGES AND JURIES VS. THE LAW (1994).
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diction over federal questions decided in state supreme courts, was constitu-
tional.93 The Court of Appeals would forward its papers in the case.
Which it never did. The Supreme Court had established its precedent,
but it never received compliance. Besides forbearing to comply, Roane
bided his time until he had another chance to rebuke the Supreme Court.
C.
In early February 1819, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in the case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.94 Here, the Court waded
into roiling New Hampshire political waters on the side of Marshall’s fel-
low Federalists. Like other New England states, New Hampshire had re-
cently switched from the Federalist into the Republican column.
Predictably, the new legislative majority decided to reorganize the state’s
leading institution of higher learning.95
Like other American colleges of colonial vintage, Dartmouth held a
charter. Marshall ruled that the charter was a private contract—incorrectly,
since New Hampshire had received no consideration for it—and so, under
the Contracts Clause, the sovereign had no claim upon it. Thus, the legisla-
tion to reorganize Dartmouth College was unconstitutional. Despite the vot-
ers, the college would remain Federalist. New Hampshire and other
Republicans’ outrage can be imagined.
XII.
A.
Virginia Republicans’ anti-judicial chagrin reached its height with the
next, truly landmark, great decision of the Marshall Court. This is where
Roane would unlimber his chief rhetorical guns. Well might he have, for
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) remains arguably the most important case in
Supreme Court history. The case centered on the extent of Congress’s legis-
lative power.
B.
Although he had as a House member invented the argument that legis-
lation chartering a bank corporation overstepped the constitutional bounds
on Congress’s power, James Madison changed his mind by the time the
Bank of the United States’ charter expired in 1811. Characteristically, how-
ever, he kept his opinion to himself. Despite Secretary of the Treasury Al-
93. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 304.
94. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
95. See NEWMYER, supra note 47, at 244–253.
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bert Gallatin’s lobbying effort, a bill to renew the charter went down to
defeat.96
Then came the War of 1812. Among reasons that war was a debacle,
the Republicans’ decision to scale back the military beginning in 1801
claims pride of place. Close behind, Madison thought, was the absence of a
Bank of the United States (BUS), which would have facilitated financing
the war. He signed a bill creating the Second Bank of the United States into
law in 1816.
Madison cloaked his evident volte-face in the rhetoric of precedent—if
this were the first time Congress had tried to charter a bank, it would be
impermissible, he said, but since it had been done before and accepted by a
string of presidents and legislatures, the issue was settled. Thus Madison,
ever touchy about his reputation for inconsistency, insisted he had not actu-
ally changed his position.
C.
While a Republican Congress and the Republican president leapt
aboard the Hamiltonian train, several state governments remained true to
the old Jeffersonian principles. Some states legislated against operation of
the bank within their territories. One, Maryland, established a substantial
tax for operating a corporation not chartered by Maryland within the state’s
territory. James McCulloch, head of the Maryland branch of the BUS, ap-
pealed a fine for operating the BUS branch within Maryland without first
paying the required fee, and the case was sped through the top Maryland
court to the US Supreme Court—where Marshall awaited it.
Newmyer speculates that perhaps this was an arranged case.97 After
all, not only did it make its way to the Supreme Court on a fast track, but
both Maryland and McCulloch had interests in the BUS’s perpetuation.
More pertinently, Marshall handed down his famous opinion in the case
within a week of oral argument.
D.
That opinion essentially echoed Hamilton’s 1791 Cabinet argument for
nearly limitless congressional legislative power. Enumeration was impracti-
cable, he said. “Necessity” under the Necessary and Proper Clause was for
Congress to judge. This was a national constitution, so these principles all
followed.
96. For Madison and bank recharter, see KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICA 310–311 (2012).
97. See NEWMYER, supra note 47, at 294–295.
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E.
Virginia Republicans were aghast. Madison privately expressed great
unhappiness with Marshall’s performance. While he agreed that the weight
of precedent must be considered dispositive in relation to Congress’s power
to charter a bank, he recoiled at the chief justice’s reasoning. Madison, the
Constitution’s leading author and Virginia’s leading ratifier, said:
It was anticipated, I believe, by few if any of the friends of
the Constitution that a rule of construction would be introduced,
as broad and as pliant as what has occurred. Those who recollect,
and still more, those who shared in what passed in the State Con-
ventions, thro’ which the people ratified the Constitution, with
respect to the extent of the powers vested in Congress, can not
easily be persuaded that the avowal of such a rule would not have
prevented its ratification.98
Madison insisted that Congress should, before undertaking to legislate
along these lines, employ its amendment power, laid out in Article V of the
Constitution, to secure the people’s consent. Madison stated:
It has been the misfortune, if not the reproach of other na-
tions, that their Governments have not been freely and deliber-
ately established by themselves. It has been the boast of ours that
such has been its source, and that it can be altered by the same
authority only which established it. It is a further boast that a reg-
ular mode of making proper alterations, has been providently in-
serted in the Constitution itself.99
He held it “anxiously to be wished . . . that no innovations may take
place in other modes; one of which would be a constructive assumption of
powers never meant to be granted.”100 Marshall’s opinion, which purported
to legitimize exercise of powers the people had not granted, thwarted the




Madison was not alone in calling the events of 1788 to mind. Another
was Judge William Brockenbrough. Brockenbrough’s response to McCul-
loch took the form of two essays under the pseudonym “Amphyction”
98. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), as quoted in KEVIN R.
C. GUTZMAN, THOMAS JEFFERSON—REVOLUTIONARY 73 (2017).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 73–74.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 40 30-MAR-18 12:55
2018] JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS V. FEDERALIST COURTS 95
which ran in the Richmond Enquirer on March 30 and April 2, 1819.102
Brockenbrough began by noting that the Court’s Marshall-era habit of unit-
ing behind one opinion left matters unclear in the careful reader’s mind: he
did not know whether all the judges were united in all of the chief justice’s
reasoning, or even in any of it. So, it could be that all agreed the bank law
was constitutional without all concurring in the assertion that the states
were not the parties to the federal compact; it could be that some thought
the bank bill fell under the Necessary and Proper Clause without giving that
clause so “latitudinous” a reading as Marshall did; possibly some of them
just thought it was for Congress to apply the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and not for the judges to interfere; perhaps, he concluded, some of them
thought the law “necessary and proper” in connection with one expressly
delegated power, while others thought it necessary and proper in relation to
another. In short, Brockenbrough would have liked seriatim opinions.103
Brockenbrough pointed out that Marshall’s opinion dealt with a ques-
tion at the center of the division between the two great parties. In doing so,
Marshall had raised two questions which “appear[ed] to [Brockenbrough] to
endanger the very existence of state rights. The first [was] the denial that
the powers of the federal government were delegated by the states; and the
second [was] that the grant of powers to that government, and particularly
the grant of powers ‘necessary and proper’ to carry the other powers into
effect, ought to be construed in a liberal, rather than a restricted sense.”104
Not only was the question whether the Federal Government’s powers
had been delegated by the states a dangerous one, but Brockenbrough
thought that deciding it was unnecessary to deciding the case at hand.
Whether the powers had been granted by one American people or “by the
states in their sovereign capacity” did not affect the extent of Congress’s
power. So why consider it?
The states as discrete communities ratified the Constitution, Brocken-
brough insisted, and thus Rhode Island remained outside the union until it
ratified, even though ninety-five percent of the American people already
had. The Federal Government depended on the state governments for its
existence, as in electing senators, drawing congressional districts, providing
for election of presidential and vice presidential electors, etc. Under Article
V, the states could amend the Constitution. Although the states created,
maintained, and could change the Constitution, the Supreme Court under-
took to claim that the states had not done so—just as in 1798–99, when
Congress imposed the Sedition Act and gave the president arbitrary author-
ity over alien friends.
102. AMPHICTYON ESSAYS 1–2, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 52–77 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 54–55.
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Without the ongoing participation of the states in the system, who
would rouse the people in response to federal usurpation, as in 1798–1800?
Brockenbrough provided extensive excerpts from the Virginia Report of
1800, known since then to have been drafted by Madison, which laid out
the Republican case for interposition of state governments in case of dan-
gerous federal usurpation.
2.
In his second Amphyction essay, Brockenbrough attacked Marshall’s
claim that the Necessary and Proper Clause should be read liberally. Here,
he took up Marshall’s conclusion, borrowed from Alexander Hamilton, that
“necessary” did not mean necessary, it might instead mean “useful, or con-
venient, or conducive to the effectual execution of the foregoing powers.”
The judge sensibly asked why the Framers, if that had been what they
meant, would have used the word “necessary.” That word, he concluded,
“certainly is not” synonymous with any of those other words. Not only that,
he continued, but if “necessary” were read as Marshall read it, it would add
nothing to “proper.” More pointedly, he noted that reading these terms as
Marshall did left “no limitation whatsoever to Congress’s authority.” He
next adduced passages from Hamilton’s contributions to The Federalist and
from Coke on Littleton to show that “necessary” meant . . . well, necessary.
Beyond that, Brockenbrough noted that reservation of power to the
states is a desirable feature of a constitution, for men are most apt to be
happy where policy is made locally, Americans were used to having policy
made by their states, the different states were differently situated, and the
Federal Government would be overwhelmingly strong if not limited by
federalism.
Brockenbrough finally took a turn very similar to the one we saw
Madison take when he first read Marshall’s reasoning in McCulloch. His
chief objection, he said, was not to Congress’s creation of a bank, but to
Marshall’s reasoning in this case. In 1816, unlike in 1791, one might argue
that the amount of bank paper in circulation made creation of the BUS
actually necessary in a sense creation of Hamilton’s had not been.
3.
a.
Upon reading these pieces, Marshall took to the papers in answer. His
brother was in Philadelphia, where he placed John’s essays in the Federalist
Union.105 They ran on April 24 and 28, 1819, under the name “A Friend to
the Union.”106
105. Id. at 14.
106. NEWMYER, supra note 47, at 337.
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Like the Federalists of ratification days, Marshall here adopted the
pose of defender of the federal union against supposed attackers. The reason
for the “Amphyction” essays, he claimed, was to drive Americans toward
disunion. The two elected branches of the Federal Government were closely
tied to the people, he asserted, while the judges’ appointments and life ten-
ure made them fat targets for critics. Thus, an enemy to the union might
think it more likely he could bring readers to hate the Federal Government
through making them hate the judiciary than that he could alienate them
from the other branches.
b.
First, Marshall countered Brockenbrough’s queries concerning the
unity of the Supreme Court in the McCulloch opinion’s reasoning by asking
whether anyone thought any of the justices would have sat silent as the
chief pronounced principles with which he did not agree. The general rule,
he noted, was that in case one opinion was announced as the opinion of the
whole court, it was the opinion of each of the judges. Amphyction’s reasons
for raising this question seemed to be to highlight the chief justice’s past
career as a Federalist politician, to associate his reasoning with Alexander
Hamilton, and thus to associate the opinion with “political heresy.” Mar-
shall was quick to note that four of the justices in the case were appointed to
the Supreme Court by Presidents Jefferson and Madison—which would
seem to guarantee they were not heretics.
c.
Next, Marshall toyed with Amphyction a bit. Why did he make so
great an effort to show that the Constitution was created by the states in
their sovereign capacity instead of by the people, Marshall wanted to know,
if the issue was unimportant? In fact, he added, if the word “states” referred
to the people of the states, then Amphyction was arguing about nothing.
d.
Yet, Marshall immediately contradicted himself. The Constitution
means what it says, the chief justice noted, and so, “We the people of the
United States” refers to the people, not the states. (Marshall did not con-
sider the import of Article VII’s use of the word “states.”) He went on to
say that Amphyction’s claim that, “the constitution was submitted to con-
ventions elected by the people of the several states . . . representing, not the
whole mass of the people of the United States, but the people only within
the limits of the respective sovereign states. . . ,” was entirely consistent
with the McCulloch court’s opinion explaining its decision. According to
Marshall, Luther Martin, as counsel for Maryland, had argued that the Con-
stitution was the act of, in Marshall’s words, “sovereign and independent
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states; clearly using the term ‘states’ in a sense distinct from the term ‘peo-
ple.’”107 This is why the Supreme Court had rejected Martin’s reasoning.
Having thus seemed to accept the Principles of ‘98, “A Friend to the
Union” then immediately contradicted them, and himself. “Nothing can be
more obvious,” he said, “than that in every part of the opinion, the terms
‘state’ and ‘state sovereignties’ are used in reference to the state govern-
ments, as contradistinguished from the people of the states” (emphasis ad-
ded). Here we see the difficulty: Marshall does not understand that so far as
Virginia Republicans are concerned, the “state sovereignties” are the peo-
ples of the individual states. To refer to a state government as a “sover-
eignty” is nonsensical.
4.
“A Friend to the Union’s” second essay considered Amphyction’s sec-
ond major objection to the Supreme Court’s opinion: Marshall’s claim that
the Necessary and Proper Clause should be read liberally. The Court had
claimed no such thing, said Marshall. Rather, it had staked out a reasonable
position—neither niggardly nor “beyond [the term’s] obvious import.” The
issue was the Necessary and Proper Clause’s “true intention,” and that was
to be read in light of the exclusion of the word “expressly” from the Tenth
Amendment (which, recall, was added to the Constitution three years after
that charter’s ratification—a ratification achieved by Federalists in part
through Governor Randolph’s assurances in the Virginia Ratification Con-
vention, in which Marshall was a participant, that Congress would have
only the powers “expressly” granted).
In the end, said Marshall, the Court stood for “the fair interpretation,”
Amphyction for “the restricted interpretation.” He laid out several examples
of federal laws that were not strictly speaking necessary to exercise of Con-
gress’s powers—in the sense that no other provision could have been sub-
stituted for a particular one in the statute—and concluded that
Amphyction’s reading would bring the Federal Government to a standstill.
What he did not provide was a single example of a hypothetical federal law
that would run aground on the “necessary” requirement. One infers that he
did not think there was one. He then repeated his language from McCulloch
to the effect that:
the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the na-
tional legislature that discretion with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution,
which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to
it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.
107. JOHN MARSHALL, “A FRIEND TO THE UNION” ESSAYS (1819), reprinted in JOHN MAR-
SHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 78, 78–105 (Gerald Gunter ed., 1969).
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Whatever one thinks of the practicalities, “necessary and proper” is
certainly an odd way to express this idea.
5.
a.
That was not the end of it. Soon after these essays’ appearance, Chief
Judge Spencer Roane of the Virginia Court of Appeals (now the Virginia
Supreme Court) assumed the venerable republican name “Hampden” as
nom de plume for four anti-McCulloch essays of his own. These too ap-
peared in the Richmond Enquirer.108
b.
Roane began by saying it had been understood by Americans that their
federal government had few powers—only those “expressly granted” and
those “necessary incidents” to such, with the rest reserved to the states. He
believed this had been the original design, and that the Tenth Amendment
merely made explicit what had already been implicit—to quiet “the natural
fears and jealousies of our citizens,” as the Preamble to the Bill of Rights
said.109
Yet, he said, this safeguard had proven inadequate. Congress had
grabbed at more power anyway, and the judiciary had chipped in to help.
Numerous congressmen had gone so far as to say that in time, Congress’s
powers would be such as they judged desirable, and Hamilton had blazed
the trail in his Report on Manufactures. The courts had deigned to “preach
political sermons from the bench . . . , and bolster up the most unconstitu-
tional measures, of the most abandoned of our rulers . . . .” Instead of estab-
lishing limits to Congress’s power, “[t]hey resolved . . . to give a general
letter of attorney to the future legislators of the union: and to tread under
foot all those parts and articles of the constitution which had been, hereto-
fore, deemed to set limits to the power of the federal legislature.”110 That
man, he concluded, “must be a deplorable idiot who does not see that there
is no earthly difference between an unlimited grant of power, and a grant
limited in its terms, but accompanied with unlimited means of carrying it
into execution.”111 What the Supreme Court had given Congress was a
power to legislate for Americans “in all cases whatsoever,” he con-
108. SPENCER ROANE, “HAMPDEN” ESSAYS (1819), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE
OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 107, 107–154 (Gerald Gunter ed., 1969).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. I, pmbl., reprinted in THOMAS E. WOODS JR. & KEVIN R. C.
GUTZMAN, WHO KILLED THE CONSTITUTION?: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VS. AMERICAN LIB-
ERTY FROM WORLD WAR I TO BARACK OBAMA 215 (2008).
110. ROANE, supra note 108, at 110.
111. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 45 30-MAR-18 12:55
100 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
cluded.112 (Educated Americans in Roane’s day would have recognized the
allusion to the Declaratory Act of 1766.)
6.
a.
Roane opened his second essay in the series by reiterating that the
Federal Government had only the enumerated powers—a point which he
underscored by quoting assurances to that effect given in the Virginia Rati-
fication Convention by Madison, Edmund Randolph, George Nicholas, and
John Marshall. He then laid out Madison’s/Virginia’s extended assertion to
this effect in the famous Report of 1800. Among other interesting points
Madison made in the Virginia Report was that “it is immaterial whether
unlimited powers be exercised under the name of unlimited powers, or
under that of unlimited means of carrying a limited power into execu-
tion. . . .” To Roane, the question came down to whether a power was
“expressly granted” or “(to use the language of the report) FAIRLY INCI-
DENT” to such a power. He went on to show that both the law of nations,
as elucidated by Vattel, and the common law were to the same effect. The
Federalist made an appearance in support of his assertion as well.
b.
Roane’s third essay summarized his case thus:
I have also shown, that . . . such means were implied, and
such only, as were essential to effectuate the power: and that this
is the case, in all the codes, of the law of nature, of nations, of,
war, of reason, and the common law. [sic] The means . . . admit-
ted by them all, and especially by the common law, are laid down,
emphatically, to be such, without which the grant cannot have its
effect. . . .
Through the rest of the piece, he assailed each of Marshall’s assertions in
turn. One particular rebuttal says that the Supreme Court’s assertion that the
Constitution must be read differently because it applies to a large space is
nonsensical: “The principles I have mentioned are immutable, and apply to
all compacts. It is entirely unimportant, whether the territory to which the
compact relates, extends from ‘Indus to the pole,’ or be no larger than that
of the county of Warwick.”113 Often, Marshall’s rhetoric was exposed as
risible.
112. Id. at 112.
113. ROANE, supra note 108, at 127.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 46 30-MAR-18 12:55
2018] JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS V. FEDERALIST COURTS 101
c.
In other places, Roane showed that Marshall is mistaken, as in his
saying that the Federal Government is “supreme.” “This word ‘supreme’
does not sound well,” the Virginia judge noted, “in a government which
acts under a limited constitution. The people only are supreme. The consti-
tution is subordinate to them, and the departments of the government are
subordinate to that constitution.” “A body which is subordinate to a com-
pact, which is subordinate to another body, can scarcely be said to be
supreme.”
The reader of Judge Roane’s extensive refutation of virtually every
significant assertion of Chief Justice Marshall cannot but feel a twinge of
sympathy for the Great Chief Justice, for whom reading these articles must
have been somewhat painful, even embarrassing. All the leading legal au-
thorities, Dr. Johnson’s dictionary, the most prominent Virginia Ratification
Convention Federalists, and even Alexander Hamilton himself are repeat-
edly enlisted in the campaign to demolish McCulloch v. Maryland.
7.
a.
In his fourth and final essay, Judge Roane made clear that he had read
both the Amphyction and the A Friend to the Union essays. He then said
that while he could not tell whether the Supreme Court considered the gov-
ernment a national one or a federal one, he agreed with Madison’s argument
in The Federalist No. 39 that the government is a federal one, because its
ratification was federal. He next cited Madison saying in the Richmond
Convention that the people as thirteen sovereignties were ratifying the Con-
stitution. He completed the hat trick by showing Madison saying the same
thing in the Virginia Report of 1800.
b.
Next, Roane countered Marshall’s insistence that the government is
national, not federal, because it acts on individual people directly, not on
the state governments by pointing to passages in both Montesquieu’s De
l’esprit des lois and The Federalist saying that a federal government may or
may not act upon individuals. Article V is his best evidence that the govern-
ment is a federal one, though it has some national structural features. He
concluded that, “Our general government then, with submission to the opin-
ion of the supreme court, is as much a federal government, or a ‘league,’ as
was the former confederation. The only difference is, that the powers of this
government are much extended.”114
114. JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 146 (Gerald Gunter ed.,
1969).
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8.
In response to these essays, Chief Justice Marshall once again took to
the newspapers—this time, the District of Columbia’s Alexandria Gazette.
Between June 30 and July 15, 1819, he wrote nine essays under the name
“A Friend of the Constitution.”115 In the first of them, the Virginia judges’
criticism of his handiwork was put down to “deep rooted and vindictive
hate, which grew out of unfounded jealousies,” and Marshall said that their
goal was “to reinstate that miserable confederation, whose incompetency to
the preservation of our union, the short interval between the treaty of Paris
and the meeting of the general convention at Philadelphia, was sufficient to
demonstrate. . . .”116 The judiciary, he said, was politically the weakest part
of the Federal Government, and thus the easiest for opponents of the Fed-
eral Government to attack.117
The people, Marshall said, created the government. They had an inter-
est in its efficacy. “Hampden’s” policy of erring against federal power,
then, might be expected sometimes to deny the people the benefit on which
they had counted in ratifying the Constitution.
9.
When his work was done, Roane mailed copies to Madison and Jeffer-
son. We have seen Madison’s response. Jefferson’s was even more support-
ive. “I have read in the Enquirer,” Jefferson told him, “and with great
approbation the pieces signed Hampden, and have read them again with
redoubled approbation in the copies you have been so kind as to send me. I
subscribe to every tittle of them.”118
XIII.
A.
Here, Jefferson would unburden himself of anti-Marshall Court frus-
tration built up over many years. Along the way, he would put the entire
conflict between his party and the Federalist judges in the starkest terms.
Roane’s articles, he said:
contain the true principles of the revolution of 1800, for that was
as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of
1776 was in its form . . . . The nation declared its will by dis-
missing functionaries of one principle, and electing those of an-
other, in the two branches, executive and legislative, submitted to
their election.
115. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), supra note 57.
116. JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 114, at 155.
117. Id. at 156.
118. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), supra note 57.
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Then he came to the great problem: that the Constitution gave the peo-
ple no elective check upon the judiciary, which had “continued the repro-
bated system.” Despite Republican presidents’ appointments, the judges
continued on the same path (“the leaven of the old mass seems to assimilate
itself to the new”).119 Two decades’ uninterrupted Republican dominance of
the elective branches of the Federal Government had not solved the prob-
lem; rather, “we find the judiciary on every occasion, still driving us into
consolidation.”120
B.
Jefferson’s sole criticism of Roane was that the Virginia judge had
granted Marshall too much. “In denying the right they usurp of exclusively
explaining the constitution,” he said, “I go further than you do, if I under-
stand rightly your quotation from the Federalist.” Publius said that the judi-
ciary would have the final say about the constitutionality of actions of the
other branches, and to Jefferson, this would make the Constitution a mock-
ery: instead of three mutually-checking branches, the system would feature
one branch entitled to direct the others—and that one “independent of the
nation,” because “experience has already shown that the impeachment it has
provided is not even a scarecrow.”121
C.
Marshall’s method, Jefferson fulminated, was to throw out opinions
unrelated to the cases at hand, with the idea that their teaching might be
useful later. Regrettably, he said, not even one member of the House of
Representatives—the institution with impeachment power—had made a
speech on the matter. The judges, then, treated the Constitution as “a mere
thing of wax . . . which they may twist, and shape into any form they
please.”
Jefferson denied that the Constitution empowered federal judges to
hold the other branches to their constitutional views. Rather, each branch
had to interpret the Constitution for itself “in the cases submitted to its
action; and especially, where it is to act ultimately . . . .” He gave examples
from his own presidential tenure, such as pardoning people convicted and
sentenced in the courts under a Sedition Act passed by Congress, withhold-
ing commissions from those of the Midnight Judges whose commissions
had not been delivered, and withholding the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty of
1806 from the Senate despite senators’ desire that it be submitted, on the
grounds that while Senate ratification was necessary to adoption of a treaty,
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D.
Whatever he thought of Jefferson’s constitutional argument, Roane
must have been thrilled at his support. Probably disappointing, however,
was Jefferson’s request that Roane keep the letter to himself. Jefferson did
not want to be drawn into a hot public dispute at just the moment when he
needed the General Assembly’s support for his fledgling state university.
His public intervention in the controversy was not needed, however. As
Newmyer said, “Rather than settling the matter definitively, McCulloch
produced a states’ rights, anti-Court reaction that diminished [the Supreme
Court’s] authority during the remainder of the antebellum period.”122
XIV.
Thomas Jefferson went to his grave bewildered at the chief justice’s
ability to enfold Republican Supreme Court appointees in his Federalist ma-
jority and distraught over the results. While Republicans had for a quarter-
century won all the political battles, Marshall had been winning the long-
term constitutional war. In retrospect, it seems that despite John Marshall’s
mastery of the craft of opinion-writing and the disappointing failure of such
as Joseph Story to advocate judicial Republicanism, the turning point in the
war came in 1805, when Justice Samuel Chase narrowly escaped the Senate
conviction he so richly deserved. Once their colleague dodged that bullet,
the other justices on the Supreme Court felt free first to rely on Hamilton’s
own reasoning in McCulloch, then to stake out increasingly extreme nation-
alist positions—whether in dubbing a charter a contract (Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward (1819)), in saying that Congress’s legislative power in
the District of Columbia could not be cabined off by the Old Dominion in
exercise of its police powers (Cohens v. Virginia (1821)), or in otherwise
extending the Federal Government’s power to new lengths.
Ultimately, Jefferson allowed his endorsement of John Taylor’s Con-
struction Construed, a book-length attack on the Marshall Court, to be
made public, which was only the second time in his life he had publicly
endorsed a book.123 For his part, Roane responded to the Supreme Court’s
Cohens decision by quoting John Marshall himself as having said in the
Virginia Ratification Convention that Article III did not expose state gov-
ernments to suit in federal courts. Despite that, and despite the 11th Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court had ruled against Virginia anyway. The judges’
power to rewrite the Constitution to suit their predilections was secure.
122. NEWMYER, supra note 47, at 270.
123. See SIMMS, supra note 44, at 181 (for this and the following point).
